



TÜRKİYE BÜYÜK MİLLET MECLİSİ

# Turkish Media: The Relations Between Turkey & Greece and “Europeanization”



M. Murat Erdoğan ★ Hüseyin Bağcı ★ F. Seda Kundakcı

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TBMM KUTUPHANESİ

**RELATIONS BETWEEN  
TURKEY & GREECE AND  
“EUROPEANIZATION”, A SURVEY BASED  
ON OFFICAL RECORDS OF TURKISH  
GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY:  
1994-2006**

**M. Murat Erdoğan - Hüseyin Bağcı - F. Seda Kundakcı**

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## FOREWORD

The relations with Europe have played a significant role in determination of reaching to the level of modern civilization Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatürk pointed out since the foundation of Republic of Turkey.

Our nation advancing in the way of prestigious constitutional state where its democracy and freedom are strengthened and peace and relief are dominant stated expressly that she sees her future in 'European Family' while joining Council of Europe in 1950.

The relations of Turkey having begun with European Economic Community in 1959 came into a new era upon the beginning of negotiations for full membership on October 3, 2005.

Completion of this process with the full membership of Turkey to the European Union as soon as possible is one of our most significant goals both in domestic and foreign policies.

Our main goal, beyond becoming a member of the EU, is to make our people reach universal common values system they deserve, to improve the level of economic welfare and to form a community which is hopeful for future and whose moral values are superior.

The Grand Assembly of Turkey has played a pioneer role in all reform efforts by carrying out her own responsibility in the period of full membership to EU.

European Union that can be regarded as a peace project is a significant element in the relations between Greece and Turkey which are two neighbor countries of the Mediterranean.

The influence of European Union on the Turkish-Greek relations has always made it feel as it displayed differences depending on periods.

There is not doubt that improvement of peace and friendship between Turkey and our neighbor Greece is beneficial for both countries. Positive developments about this issue in recent years have raised our hopes towards future.

Turkish-Greek Relations have been dealt within the context of the EU, in the work prepared in consequence of analysis made on Minutes of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) which form the legislative memory of our Parliament.

I would like to congratulate the distinguished academicians M. Murat Erdoğan, Hüseyin Bağcı and F.Seda Kundakçı who offer solution dealing with our nation's important foreign policy issues with academic sensibility with this work.

I believe that this substantial work published by our Assembly will contribute both to Turkish-Greek relations and joining efforts of Turkey to the EU.

**Köksal TOPTAN**  
Speaker of  
Grand National Assembly  
of Turkey

## Table of Contents

Foreword	1
Introduction	2
I. The Field, the Universe and the Methodology of Research	7
II. The General Characteristics of Turkish Politics in the Context of Foreign Policy Making: 1994-2006	9
A. The TGNA General Elections	9
B- Governments of Turkish Republic:	12
C- The Matters of Greece, Cyprus and EU in the Government Programmes	15
III. Analysis of the Protocols	18
A. Periodic-Chronologic Evaluation	18
1. TGNA 19. Term (19-4, 19-5. Legislative Years): September 1994- December 1995	20
a. General Political Situation: 1994-1995	20
b. Protocol Summaries: September 1994- November 1995: TGNA 19-4 and 19-5. Legislative Years:	23
2. TGNA 20. Term (20-1, 20-2, 20-3, 20-4. Legislative Years): January 1996- April 1999	31
a. General Political Situation: 1996-1999	31
b. Protocol Summaries: January 1996- December 1998: TGNA 20-1 and 20-2 Legislative Years	37
3. TGNA 21. Term (21-1, 21-2, 21-3,21-4. Legislative Years): April 1999-September 2002	49
a. General Political Situation: 1999-2002	49
b. The Protocol Summaries: TGNA 21st Term (21-1, 21-2, 21-3 and 21-4 Legislative Years): April 1999-October 2002	52
4. TGNA 22nd Term (22-1, 22-2, 22-3,22-4.Legislative Years): November 2002-July 2004	67
a. General Political Situation: 2002-2006	67
b. Protocols: November 2002- December 2006: TGNA 22. Term 1, 2, 3, 4. Legislative Years	71
B- Examination of the Protocols in the Contexts of Subject Headings	80
1- EU	80
2- Cyprus	82
3- Bilateral Issues: Aegean, the Continental Shelf, Minorities, PKK	82
Conclusion	83
Appendix: The Decisions Adopted in the TGNA about Cyprus	89
I. Resolution of the TGNA: 21 January 1997	89
II. Resolution of the TGNA:15 July 1999	92
III. Resolution of the TGNA: 6 March 2003	94
Abbreviations	96



## Foreword

When looking at the relations which firstly begins with the European Economic Community and later goes on with the European Community and European Union, it can be easily seen that relations between Turkey and Greece is indispensable part of this process. Though these two neighbour states applied for the "partnership" in 1959 to the European Economic Community of that time, a new period between Turkey and the Community, in which Greece had a crucial role, began with the full membership of Greece. "Europeanization" of matters between two states like Cyprus and minorities by Greece further complicated the matters. Following the announcement of Turkey a candidate in 1999, it is generally accepted there has been constructive alternation and this caused to hasten Turkey's relations with EU. This study examines the "Europeanization" and the interaction between the relations of two states in the framework of relations with EU. In the study, answers of the questions regarding the role of Europeanization on hindrance the highly accurate conflict potential and on the solution of the matters, to what extend it is minded and the perceptions about the role of EU, have been searched.

In this comprehensive study regarding the role of Europeanization on the realtions between Turkey and Greece, TGNA as a political institution and Turkish media due to its presentation of perceptions of public opinion have been discussed as two independant field of study. Examined as a most important political institution and held as subject of this book, in the study of TGNA 20.600 pages of protocol that has been on the issue of Greece and has come out from the 189 sessions the GNAT have had in 12 years between 1994-2006 are particularly analyzed in the context of both chronology and theme.

This study has been developed with the related data of "Conflict Settlement Through Europeanization? Greece and its Neighbours Macedonia and Turkey" which has been directed by Prof. Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, who is holder of a Jean Monnet Chair and also a director of Jean Monnet Research Group ([www.europeanization.de](http://www.europeanization.de)). This study has been applied in Germany, Turkey, Greece and Macedonia between 2005-2008 and has been assisted by Volkswagen Foundation. In this respect, we specially want to thank Prof. Dr. Heinz-Jürgen Axt, the head of the team executing the project, and Mr. Simor: Wiegand and Mr. Oliver Schwarz from the project team and also Volkswagen Foundation that provided us to realize this study.

We also thank to Mr. Köksal Toptan, president of TGNA, for his support for the publication of this study, Yaşar Yakış, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yrd.Doç.Dr. Zülfükar Sayın, the workers of the printing house of TGNA and the ones who helped us during our study Eyüp Sabri Kürüm, Serkan Yolaçan and Rukiye Can Yalçın.

**Authors**

## Introduction

This study aims to analyze the relations between Turkey and Greece through post-cold war era around Claudio Radaelli's<sup>1</sup> concept of "Europeanization" and to do this; the official account of proceedings and agenda of Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) between 1994 and 2006 are applied as primary sources. That is to say, in TGNA to what extent Turkey's membership to European Union is perceived and enounced as a conflict resolving and peace settling factor between two countries. The effects of multi dimensional and complicated relations between the countries on their both domestic and especially foreign policies are examined throughout the presented period with horizontal (chronological) and vertical (thematic) analyses with the incidents provided from the agenda of the TGNA.

Having set their borders, their claims on the Aegean Sea and the matter of status of minorities with respect to the Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), Turkey and Greece, despite a few problems, succeeded in the conflict evasion-friendship policy executed by the founders of the two countries: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Venizelos. After the World War II, the pattern of relations has changed according to the new global, regional and ideological developments. Perhaps the most crucial element of this period was the establishment of NATO in 1949 by the Western-capitalist allies led by U.S.A, who were very anxious because of the socialist block led by the Soviet Union, and the setting off allies according to the security-ideology platform. In 1955, the both sides became more solid with the establishment of Warsaw Pact. This situation elevated Turkish Greek relations to a much more critical position, a strategic international position, rather than relations of just two neighbors. For the sake of security and stability of allies and more crucially for the prevention of Soviet Union's attempt to penetrate into Mediterranean and even for the problems between Turkey and Greece, other powers stepped in the process.

During the first decades of the cold war era, Turkey and Greece were especially crucial for U.S.A for strategic reasons. In 1947, U.S.A provided development aids for both Turkey and Greece within the framework of Truman Doctrine and also these countries were made closer to the U.S. militarily. The balance between the two "rival neighbors", accepted to the NATO in 1952 by the initiative of U.S.A in terms of convincing allies, were always drawing the attention of the Western powers. The danger of

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<sup>1</sup> Claudio M. Radaelli: *Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?*, in: European Integration Online Papers, 8 (2004) 16 (<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf>, Stand: 15.02.2007), p. 3.

creating weakness in the security of Western allies in the Mediterranean region because of the problems occurred especially about Cyprus and Aegean disputes between Turkey and Greece, who became "allies" and chose to be with Western-capitalist world under the umbrella of the NATO during the cold war, forced the U.S-led Western powers to intervene into Turkish-Greek relations at several times.

Cold War conditions were also highly decisive in the assessment and acceptance of the "associated membership" demands of Turkey and Greece from the European Economic Community (EEC) in July 1959. Although relations of two countries with the EEC differentiated both in terms of progression and content, due to the 27 May 1960 Military Coup in Turkey, Western allies seriously followed the "balance" factor for both parties during these years. With the EEC, Greece signed "Athens" Agreement in 9 July 1961 and Turkey signed Ankara Agreement in 12 September 1963. Consequently, Turkey and Greece, despite their rivalries and conflicts, became two allies not only under the context of the NATO but also under the EEC candidanship. From the midst of 50's, however, many problems, including proceedings in Cyprus, disputes about minorities and correlative right claims on Aegean started to play a great role in affecting local and foreign agenda of the two allies. Since 1950s, Cyprus has been the leading subject matter of conflicts between Turkey and Greece. Even though the foundation of the independent "Cyprus Republic" on the island by 1959-1960 London-Zurich Agreements under the guarantorship of England, Turkey and Greece; it was understood that this government was far away from forming a suitable platform for lessening the conflicts and living in peace with harmony. During 1960s, having serious crisis because of Cyprus and holding over conflicts following the pressures of Western powers and mainly the U.S, Turkey and Greek side could not escape from the military conflict in 1974. A war on Cyprus Island between two NATO members and the tension that may turn into a new hot clash at any moment were also crucial in terms of the military-political strategy that was going to be built up by the USSR against Western block. Thus, the Western block led by U.S.A tried to develop alternative policies in order to resolve and even to put an end to the disputes between the two allies. In this context, the NATO was the most important instrument, but it could not be sufficient. Consequently the EEC/EC/EU has had the potential of being an important tool in solving problems and developing cooperation between Turkey and Greece. But because of Turkey's lower level in comparison to Greece in terms of socio-economic development, it's immense population, large physical geography, historical and cultural conflicts with Europe, risks of the region that Turkey is located in and especially the deductions occurring

because of the military administrations; the process evoked in parallel and jointly in 1959 started to diverge and this situation even formed a new anxiety. Especially after Greece's membership of the EEC in 1981, significant aspects of Turkish-Greek relationship became as Turkey's relationships with the EEC. Greece's policy to keep her national interests and its problems with Turkey in the context of EEC succeeded to a great degree and this juncture resulted in some tension in the relations between Turkey and Europe.

After the Cold War, that is to say after 1990, the dynamics of the relationship significantly changed. Turkey's membership to the EU encountered with a greater resistance in the European countries who had supported Turkey's close relations with the Western allies mainly for geo-strategic reasons since 1959.<sup>2</sup> Turkey's membership to the EU was reassessed because of many reasons like; the excluding attributes of new identity seeking process in Europe towards Turks and Turkey, the end of security concerns of the Cold War, the concerns about possible migration waves which may come from a poor and overpopulated Turkey, while the unemployment and other social problems has not been solved in Europe yet. Additionally, the enthusiastic demands of Middle and Eastern European countries for EU membership and the support of European public opinion in this respect and more importantly the insistent attitude of Greece on making Cyprus Greek Administration (Cyprus-GA)<sup>3</sup> a member to the EU with the title of "Cyprus Republic" claiming that they represent the whole island changed the balances totally. It can be said that in 90's, Turkey's attempts for being a member of EU, became the most crucial instrument of Greece's policies about Turkey.

Radelli's generally accepted definition about "Europeanization" is closely related with the EU. Radelli states that: "*Europeanization consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and*

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<sup>2</sup> Heinz Kramer: *Die Europaeische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei, Internationale Politik und Sicherheit-Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik/ SWP*, 21, Nomos Verlag, Baden Baden, 1988, p.24; Hüseyin Bağcı: *Demokrat Parti Dönemi Dış Politikası*, İmge Kitabevi, Ankara, 1990, s. 72-79; M.Murat Erdoğan: *Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye-AB İlişkileri: 1990-2005*, Yayınlanmamış Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara, 2006.

<sup>3</sup> The *de facto* and legal status of the Republic of Cyprus is controversial due to the changes it went through as a state founded by Turkish and Greek people in Cyprus with the 1959-60 Agreements. This is especially the case with Turkey. Since 1974, there has been a *de facto* bicameral structure in Cyprus with two different governments being on duty in two different regions where two different population lives. Although the UN has recognized the Cyprus Greek Administration as the only legitimate state on the island, this does suffice to explain the *de facto* situation. In this context, the Cyprus Greek Administration, which is recognized as the Republic of Cyprus by the EU too, is named "Cyprus-GA" and the Cyprus Turkish side is named Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, political structures and public policies“<sup>4</sup> This definition is very similar with the “Europeanization” concept perceived in Turkey. When looking at the question of “Whether Europeanization, which is understood as moving with EU in tight and strong relations in terms of economic and political context, could be used as an instrument to solve disputes between Turkey and Greece in a peaceful manner?”, it can be said that the first point drawing attention is the imbalance resulted from status difference. That is to say, the imbalance which resulted from the full EU membership of Greece and Turkey’s current position as a candidate, makes it difficult to utilize Europeanization as an instrument.<sup>5</sup> Since it can be easily seen that Greece used the EU instrument in favor of its national interests from time to time such that it can even result in a clash between Turkey and the EU. Indeed, through looking at the developments in the relations between Turkey and Greece during the period between 1994 and 2006, by looking at both positive and negative examples it could be understood how effective the Europeanization instrument is. In the analysis below, especially these periods have been subjected to detailed examination:

- 1995: The bargaining period that was formed following the demands of Greece about Cyprus which is related with the Customs Union agreement to be realized between Turkey and the EU;
- In the beginning of 1996, Turkey’s being on the verge of a war with Greece because of the Kardak-Imia islets in Aegean Sea and EU’s taking position together with Greece; and again at the same days the problems that aroused because of the tension in S-300 and the Cyprus border zone;
- December 1997: The period created by Ankara’s cut off the dialogue with the EU in response to the exclusion of Turkey in the EU Council Luxembourg Summit from the list of candidates and the inclusion of the Cyprus-GA to the list of the same Summit;
- The new period following Greece’s overcoming with a successful political maneuver the process, in which Turkey carried out an operation to capture the PKK Leader A. Öcalan and which would have resulted in labeling Greece as the “country assisting terror;”

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<sup>4</sup> Radaelli, Claudio M.: *Europeanisation: Solution or Problem?*, in: European Integration Online Papers, 8 (2004) 16 (<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2004-016.pdf>, Stand: 15.02.2007), S. 3

<sup>5</sup> Heinz-Jürgen Axt: *Europeanization on the Coastlines of the Aegean? Greek-Turkish Relations since 1999*, Duisburg, 22 August 2006. ([http://www.europeanization.de/downloads/coastlines\\_aegean.pdf](http://www.europeanization.de/downloads/coastlines_aegean.pdf)) Retrieved 10.02.2007)

and following Turkey's being declared a candidate in December 1999;

- The period in which the degree to which the decision taken in Helsinki was to affect the reform efforts in Turkey and the relations with Turkey was to be clearly seen;
- November 2002: The period shaped by the AK Party's (Justice and Development Party) policy that has linked the problems about Greece and Cyprus to the EU for the first time;
- The period, which lasted until the Summit held in December 2004 where the decision to start the negotiations was taken, and which was centered around the relations with Greece and the Cyprus issue;
- The period related to the problems regarding Cyprus arose before and after the negotiations began have all been examined in the context of Europeanization.

## **I. The Field, the Universe and the Methodology of Research**

In this research, first, the decision making processes concerning Turkish foreign policy is briefly evaluated; in this context, the parliamentary arithmetic in Turkey from 1994 to 2006, the governments which have been in power and their approach -as manifested in their government programs- towards the issue of Europeanization as well as the relations with Greece are put forth for consideration.

The main component of the research is the discussions in the TGNA regarding this issue. In this respect, the parliamentary protocols of a total of 14 legislation years belonging to the 4 "Periods" (19, 20, 21, 22) between 1994-2006 are all scanned. All the related ones, that is, 20.600 pages of protocol that has come out from the 189 sessions the TGNA have had in this 12 years are particularly examined and analyzed.

Two different axes are set out in the examination and analysis -in the framework of "Europeanization"- of the protocols of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TGNA) meetings held between 1994-2006. One of these is the "periodic-chronologic" analysis of the discussions in the TGNA in relation with the government policies corresponding to the same period. The second is the evaluation of the relations throughout this process between Turkey and Greece with respect to the main headings (thematic analysis).in this process.

**Table-1: TGNA Protocols Examined in the Research**

Date	TGNA Term	Legislative Year	Total Number of Sessions	Number of Sessions where Turkish-Greek Relations are discussed	Pages of Examined Protocols
01/09/1994-16/08/1995	19	4	149	20	1519
01/10/1995-04/12/1995	19	5	42	6	437
03/04/1996-02/08/1996	20	1	87	8	852
01/10/1996-16/08/1997	20	2	137	19	1450
01/10/1997-30/07/1998	20	3	131	20	3222
01/10/1998-25/03/1999	20	4	64	6	690
02/05/1999-27/08/1999	21	1	59	10	940
01/10/1999-30/06/2000	21	2	123	19	2875
01/10/2000-28/09/2001	21	3	135	13	1494
01/10/2001-10/08/2002	21	4	128	13	1531
14/11/2002-31/07/2003	22	1	114	18	1159
01/10/2003-26/09/2004	22	2	124	13	798
01/10/2003-26/09/2004	22	3	127	9	1334
11/10/2005-28/09/2006	22	4	131	15	2306
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2720</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>20.607</b>

## **II. The General Characteristics of Turkish Politics in the Context of Foreign Policy Making: 1994-2006**

### **A. The TGNA General Elections**

During the period between 1994 and 2006, four general elections of 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2002 have been held in Turkey and political panorama have seriously been changed. Furthermore, this political panorama has got even more complicated with the party transfers following the elections, foundation of new parties and closure of others. The following table shows the numerical proportions of the group of political parties in the TGNA between the years 1994-2006<sup>6</sup>:

As it can be seen from the table, particularly in the 2002 elections, the political spectrum changed to a great degree as 5 political parties (DSP, ANAP, MHP, DYP, and FP), which previously had been represented in the TGNA, could not pass the 10% threshold and fell out of the Parliament thereby. Founded just 15 months before the elections (14 August 2001), Justice and Development Party<sup>7</sup> -despite the fact that its president R. T. Erdoğan could not be an ANAP candidate in the last minute due to the political ban on him- won 362 of the 550 seats in the parliament with the 34,5% of the votes while the social democrat CHP, which had not been able to pass the 10% threshold in the previous elections, won 179 seats with the 18% of the votes. Hence, 11 years after 1991, a one-party (without a coalition) government could be established.

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<sup>6</sup> In Turkey, after 1995, 1999, and 2002 TGNA Elections MPs changed parties or founded new political parties to a degree that would change the parliamentary structure. The table here shows the moment when the elections were just held and the final results were announced. For instance, whereas two political parties (AK Parti and CHP) and 8 independent MPs got into the parliament, by January 2007, out of 550 MPs, AK Parti has 354, CHP has 153, MP has 21, DYP has 4, PAP has 1, SHP has 1, Young Party has 1; also 6 seats are empty due to the threshold. That is to say, 5 more parties have got into the TGNA, which had started out with 2 parties, and the numbers of MPs the AK Parti and the CHP have decreased from 365 to 354 and from 177 to 153, respectively.

<sup>7</sup> The Virtue Party (FP) was shut down by the Constitutional Court in 22 June 2001. 102 FP MPs became independent. The Justice and Development Party was founded under the presidency of R. T. Erdoğan in 14 August 2001. The following day (August 15) those 51 of those independent MPs from FP became a member of the AK Parti.

**Table-2: Elections, Political Parties and Governments in Turkey**

Political Party	TGNA General Elections 21.10.1991 19. Term	TGNA General Elections 24.12.1995 20. Term	TGNA General Elections 18.04.1999 21. Term	TGNA General Elections 03.11.2002 22. Term
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AK Parti (Justice and Development Party)	-	-	-	365 (%34,28)
Anavatan Partisi-ANAP (Motherland Party)	115 (%24,01)	132 (%19,65)	86 (%13,22)	- (%5,31)
Demokratik Sol Parti - DSP (Democratic Left Party)	7 (% 10,8)	76 (%14,64)	136 (%22,19)	- (%1,22)
Doğru Yol Partisi-DYP (True Path Party)	178 (%27,03)	135 (%19,18)	85 (%12,01)	- (%9,54)
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) **	-	- (%8,18)	129 (%17,98)	- (%8,36)
Refah Partisi-RP (Welfare Party) Fazilet Partisi-FP (Virtue Party) Saadet Partisi- SP (Felicity Party)***	62 (%18,88)	158 (%21,38)	111 (%15,41)	- (%2,49)
Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti -SHP (Social Democratic People's Party) Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi - CHP (Republican People's Party)****	88 (%20,75)	49 (%10,71)	- (%8,71)	177 (%19,39)
Independent	-	-	3	8
<b>TGNA (MP)</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>550</b>

**Table-3: Governments in Turkey (1994-2006)**

Political Party	TGNA General Elections 21.10.1991 19. Term	TGNA General Elections 24.12.1995 20. Term	TGNA General Elections 18.04.1999 21. Term	TGNA General Elections 03.11.2002 22. Term
	49. Government: DYP-CHP (SHP) P.Minister: S.Demirel	53. Government: ANAP-DYP P.Minister: M.Yilmaz	57. Government:DSP- MHP-ANAP P.Minister: B.Ecevit	58. Government: AK Parti P. Minister: A.Gül
	50. Government : DYP-CHP (SHP) P.Minister: T.Çiller	54. Government: RP-DYP P.Minister: N.Erbakan		59. Government: AK Parti P.Minister: R.T.Erdoğan
	51. Government: DYP (minority) P.Minister: T.Çiller	55. Government: ANAP-DSP-DSP P.Minister: M.Yilmaz		
	52. Government: DYP-CHP P.Minister: T.Çiller	56. Government: DSP (minority) P. Minister: B.Ecevit		

\*The table shows only the seats and the votes won by the parties that passed the 10% threshold.

\*\* In the 1991 elections MHP made an alliance with Welfare Party and entered the elections under the name of FP.

\*\*\*Welfare Party had participated in the elections in 1991 and 1995, after it was closed by the Constitutional Court; the party MPs founded the Virtue Party and participated in the 1999 elections with this name. After it was closed, while half of the MPs founded the Felicity Party, the other group headed by R. T. Erdoğan and A. Gül founded the AK Parti; therefore they participated in the 2002 elections as two different parties. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that SP bears the political heritage of RP and FP.

\*\*\*\* Social Democratic People's Party participated in the 1991 elections through an alliance with People's Labor Party (HEP), and following the elections 22 MPs belonging to the latter left the SHP to be MPs of their own party. In 1993, SHP and CHP united in CHP under the leadership of Deniz Baykal and since then they have participated in the elections under the name of CHP.

## **B- Governments of Turkish Republic:**

In Turkey, ten governments were founded in the period of 1994-2005. Six of them were coalitions, two of them were minority governments and the last two of these governments were established by the AK Party, which won a significant portion of the votes in the elections.<sup>8</sup> Six of these ten governments remained in duty less than one year. In the same period, six prime ministers and eleven ministers of foreign affairs were appointed for duty. In this interval, the longest period of rule was that of AK Parti, which was established by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on 14 March 2003. For Turkey, the period between 1994 and 2002 was an era in which Turkey faced a great political inconsistency due to either coalition governments or the minority governments were in power.

In this research, the political system in Turkey, the party system and the relations of parliament with government have important attributes which must be considered. In this context, there is a need for highlighting two points as to the TGNA elections and the relation established between the governments and deputy distribution. First of these is related to the existence of parliamentary system. Parliamentary system creates a close, even a one-to-one, relation between state of being in power and approaches of political parties in the TGNA. This condition causes the representatives of political parties to determine their positions, especially on foreign issues, according to which side they are a member of, ruling party or opposing party. The relations with EU are possibly the most remarkable examples of this case. As it'll be seen in much more detail in the latter chapters, the ruling party representatives claim they always protect Turkey's interests and make advancements whereas the opposition parties claim that serious concessions have been made and threats regarding "national matters" have grown considerably. In other words, the primary determinant of the statements of deputies is their part in the Assembly, whether a party in power or in opposition. The second important matter is related to the problem of "power" experienced by the coalition governments which have conflicts even within their own structure and do not have a strong support from the parliament. Political instability and conflicted environment caused by coalitions prevents Turkey from taking progressive steps in fundamental matters which also includes problems of foreign affairs like the relations with Greece and the matter of Cyprus. It is no coincidence that the most serious steps in relations with Greece have been taken by the government

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<sup>8</sup> The first government of 19. Period established by DYP, headed by Süleyman Demirel, and SHP, headed by Erdal İnönü in November 1991 after the general elections held on 21 October 1991 ended after S. Demirel became the President.

of ANAP under the presidency of Turgut Özal in 1983-1990 and by AK Parti which has been in power since 2002. The common characteristic of these two governments is that they both came to power single-handedly and both owned the majority of the seats in parliament. In the period of 1999-2002, the policy Greece had to pursue after the Abdullah Öcalan scandal, personal relationship as well as the effort of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries, İsmail Cem and Yorgo Papandreou, affect the performance of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition, headed by Bülent Ecevit, in the matters of Cyprus and Greece but these factors are not sufficient to take radical steps. Early falls of the governments, frequent changes in political staff are also among the factors directly affecting this process. For example, it is not so uneasy to imagine how difficult it is to carry out even the daily policies, let alone making radical decisions, for the DYP-SHP (CHP) coalition (50th Government of T.R.) which remained in power for two years and four months and changed the Minister of Foreign Affairs for four times in this period. By the way, it needs to be recalled that period of ruling is 25 days for 51st government, 5 months for 52nd government, 3 months for 53rd government, 1 year for 54th government, 4,5 months for 56th government and 4 months for 58th government.

**Table-4: Governments and Ministers of Turkish Republic: 1994-2006  
(50-59<sup>th</sup> Governments)**

T.R. 50. Government (Coalition): DYP-SHP (CHP) [25.06.1993- 05.10.1995] (2 years 4 months)	<b>The Prime Minister:</b> Tansu Çiller (DYP) <b>The Ministers of Foreign Affairs:</b> Hikmet Çetin (SHP-CHP), Mümtaz Soysal (SHP) Murat Karayalçın (SHP) Erdal İnönü (CHP)
T.R. 51. Government (Single Party-Minority): DYP [05.10.1995- 30.10.1995] (25 days)	<b>The Prime Minister:</b> Tansu Çiller (DYP), <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> Ali Coşkun Kırca
T.R. 52. Government (Coalition): DYP- CHP [30.10.1995- 06.03.1996] (5 months)	<b>The Prime Minister:</b> Tansu Çiller (DYP), <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister:</b> Deniz Baykal (CHP)
T.R. 53. Government (Coalition): ANAP-DYP [06.03.1996- 28.06.1996] (3 months)	<b>The Prime Minister:</b> Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP), <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> Emre Gonensay (DYP)
T.R. 54. Government (Coalition): RP-DYP [28.06.1996- 30.06.1997] (1 year)	<b>The Prime Minister:</b> Necmettin Erbakan (RP), <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister:</b> Tansu Çiller (DYP)
T.R. 55. Government (Coalition): ANAP-DSP-DSP [30.06.1997- 11.01.1999] (1,5 year)	<b>The Prime Minister:</b> Mesut Yılmaz (ANAP), <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> İsmail Cem (DSP)
T.R. 56. Government: DSP (Single Party-Minority) [11.01.1999- 28.05.1999] (4,5 month)	<b>The Prime Minister :</b> Bulent Ecevit (DSP) <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> İsmail Cem (DSP)
T.R. 57. Government (Coalition): DSP-MHP-ANAP: [28.05.1999- 18.11.2002] (3 years 6 months)	<b>The Prime Minister :</b> Bulent Ecevit (DSP) <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> İsmail Cem (DSP)
T.R. 58. Government (Single Party-Majority): AK Parti [18.11.2002- 11.03.2003] (4 months)	<b>The Prime Minister :</b> Abdullah Gül (AK Parti) <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> Yasar Yakış (AK Parti)
T.R. 59. Government (Single Party-Majority): AK Parti [14.03.2003-?]	<b>The Prime Minister :</b> R. Tayyip Erdoğan (AK Parti) <b>The Minister of Foreign Affairs:</b> Abdullah Gül (AK Parti)

## C- The Matters of Greece, Cyprus and EU in the Government Programmes

In the programs of 10 Governments that took the office between 1994 and 2006, usually a similar approach towards the matters regarding Greece, Cyprus and the EU is observed. In the government programmes, a serious sensitiveness about preventing the issues with Greece and Cyprus from being "Europeanized" strikes the eye and such a correlation is rejected. Moreover, in the programme of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition (28.05.1999-18.11.2002), in which B. Ecevit served as the Prime Minister and I. Cem as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, states the boundaries of "Europe" issue with a striking expression which has never been used in the other programmes:

*"The well meant and constructive attempts to solve the matters, especially the ones regarding Aegean, between Greece and Turkey through dialogue will continue. We expect Greece to take a certain position on the struggle against terror including PKK especially and our relations not to be overshadowed by EU."*<sup>9</sup>

The programme of the last Government, established under the Presidency of R.T. Erdoğan on 14 March 2003, could be said to be distinguished from the other programmes in points of "Europeanization" and resolving the matters with Greece in this context. After AK Parti won the elections by receiving an important portion, beyond the estimates, of the votes, R.T. Erdoğan, AK Parti leader who could not participate in the elections held on 3 November 2002 because of political ban on him, embarked on an intense diplomatic attack until the summit of Council of EU which would be held on 12-13 December 2002 in Copenhagen for determination of a date to begin the negotiations for membership. The approach of R.T. Erdoğan, who was engaged in meetings for membership in the capitals of all EU member countries including Athens, represented an important political change. R.T. Erdoğan, in his declaration on 19 November 2002, shared his views on the issue and declared the main lines of the future policy in the following way: *"Wherever we go in Europe, it's all the same. They ask what we will do about Cyprus and Europe Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Turkey cannot receive a date from Copenhagen if the issue of Cyprus does remain unresolved, they say. In other words, all*

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<sup>9</sup>Programme of 57. Government of T.R. ([http://www.dilevi.org/secimsonucu/57\\_hukümet.htm](http://www.dilevi.org/secimsonucu/57_hukümet.htm))

*three in one package! This is the case even if we do not say so. So it is useful to consider all these three issues as one package. There is no point in ostrich policies. Are we losing Cyprus? What does it mean to lose, or to win, Cyprus? Finding the just, permanent, right resolution in Cyprus is what the real patriotism is... What did we get out of the hawk policies? Did it come to anything? Without the outcome, be a hawk as long as you want, so what? We are talking about the glass half- full, not half-empty.*"<sup>10</sup>

Adoption of "Europeanness" as an instrument in the context of eliminating the disputed environment which concentrated on Cyprus issue from 60's forward, formed between Turkey and Greece since 1950's was, for the first time, stated this expressly with the "package" approach which also included the ESDP.<sup>11</sup> Even though this approach was severely criticized by the supporters of the classical policy and by Rauf Denktaş in the TRNC, it could be said it was welcomed by Turkish community and the Government received support in this respect. But Erdoğan's "package" approach did not have a pronounced reflection on the first government programme of the AK Parti. (58.Government of T.R. under the presidency of A. Gül)

The first government programme clearly associating the disputes of Turkey with Greece and Cyprus with the EU is that of 2. Government established by the AK Parti (59.Government of T. R.) in which R.T. Erdoğan took over the office of Prime Minister. In the programme, a highly warm perspective in the relations with Greece is presented<sup>12</sup>,

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<sup>10</sup> Milliyet (Daily Newspaper, Turkey): 20.11.2002 (Erdogan: "Turkey cannot receive a date from Copenhagen unless the issue of Cyprus does not remain unresolved, they say"); Günter Seufert: Berliner Zeitung (Germany): 22.11.2002.; "Erdogan is Preparing a Package"; (C.Sr.): Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland): 20.11..2002, "The Last Chance for Cyprus?"; Rainer Hermann: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany) 19.11.2002 "The New Leader of Turkey in Athens" Hasan Cemal: "Losing Cyprus, Acquiring Cyprus with Tayyip!", (Daily Newspaper, Turkey): 22.11.2002.

<sup>11</sup> Erdoğan noted in response to a journalist who said "You will have changed Turkish thesis which wanted to discuss EU and ESDP separately" by saying "Actually, this was the artificial side of the issue. Everybody was aware they were related to each other. But what they said was "Cyprus and this issue are different". Now, they all come to say Turkey cannot receive a date from EU without a resolution for Cyprus issue. This is the approach. You realize this during the negotiations. We encounter the same approach in every place we visit. In other words, yours is one of the common questions". Erdoğan answered a question addressed by another journalist "We've heard the beginning of a new policy from you. You are talking about one single package. If the package is discussed as a whole, don't you think it might bring an approach such that a negotiation date will not be given unless Cyprus matter is resolved, don't you think this will strengthen the hand of other side?" by saying: "Now, on the contrary, our thesis presents this: We present our positive approach to the other party by making the plan negotiable. Turkey also covered a long distance about ESDP. ... Now, you have to give us a date of negotiation so that we will be able to take a positive position in other disputes too. This is what we mean by our thesis" Milliyet (Daily Newspaper, Turkey): 20.11.2002.

<sup>12</sup> " We are determined to construct our relations our neighbor Greece on the basis of a competition to generate a synergy from which both nations can derive benefit, not on a hostility basis. The relations

moreover the programme emphasizes the frustration felt because the plan UN General Secretary prepared did not yield any tangible result in Hague but the efforts on this issue would continue. Erdoğan's "package solution" approach is reflected as follows:

*"... We call upon all the political foci, especially EU member states and Greece, to be sensitive on the basis of resolution, dialogue and permanent peace..."<sup>13</sup>*

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*with Greece that stand on bilateral economic interests will continue and through the atmosphere of trust created by these relations will prepare the grounds for resolving more complicated political issues."*

<sup>13</sup> Programme of 59. Government of T.R. ([http://www.dilevi.org/secimsonucu/59\\_hukumet.htm](http://www.dilevi.org/secimsonucu/59_hukumet.htm))

### **III. Analysis of the Protocols**

#### **A. Periodic-Chronologic Evaluation**

The recent history of relations between Turkey and Greece constitutes an inseparable oneness with the policies on EU. Without any doubt, the concept of "Europeanization" can be viewed as a vital instrument which can not be disregarded in defining the relations as negative or as positive. But between 1994 and 2006, there have been events which have caused the relations, in the form of conflict or rapprochement, to come to spotlight. This is also evident in the study on the TGNA protocols. For example, in parallel with the increase in the intensity of relations between the EU and Turkey in order for Turkey to accomplish CU with the EU, "communication-interaction" between Turkey and Greece also peaks. An important portion of the discussions in the TGNA on the EU is about the effect of Greece on the process. Kardak-Imia crisis which broke out at the beginning of 1996 right after this period can be seen as a crucial case in evaluating the mutual relations in the context of Europeanization concept. In analogy with this, before and after the EU Council Summit held in Luxemburg in December 1997, Turkey's approach towards the EU is also expressed mostly in the context of Greece and Cyprus. The year of 1999 also indicates to an important period. In this year, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan hid in Embassy of Greece in Kenya and then, was captured. In this period, Greece was the country which was criticized fiercely in Turkey on political level and Turkey-EU relations and Greece's attitude in this respect were the themes that were the most frequently expressed. The relations between Turkey-Greece and Cyprus were the key issues in the EU Council Helsinki Summit held in December 1999, in which Turkey was given the status of candidate, and in the political negotiations before the summit. Another important period was experienced at the end of 2002. The relations with Greece and Cyprus matter are the key issues while the AK Parti, after winning the elections, tries to receive a negotiation date. In this period, the new approaches and the efforts of Turkey to modify the classic policies on Greece and Cyprus were highly effective and Turkey admitted, for the first time, the existence of the connection between the relations with the EU and its policies on Greece-Cyprus. The year of 2003 is an intense period that Turkey-Greece and EU relations came to spotlight due to the plan proposed by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan about Cyprus. EU also participated actively in the process. The negotiations and discussions before the EU Council Summit Meeting, in which Turkey was given a date for the negotiations, held in

December 2004 (Cyprus-GA, assumed to represent the whole Cyprus, was also present in the discussions as an EU member state in the name of "Republic of Cyprus") makes its mark on the last years of the period between 1994-2006.<sup>14</sup> Finally, the difficult period experienced before 3 October 2005 on which Turkey started the negotiations for membership is another important date.

These vital periods regarding the issue of Greece (and Cyprus) which is almost the main component of the relations between Turkey and the EU also reflects on the discussions in the TGNA. The investigation in analysis chapter below subjects four terms of the TGNA to examination under different headings. Since the parliamentary system strengthened by the party discipline almost causes a formation of "unanimity" within the cabinets and within the majority of parliament, the analysis below also represents the government of that term and features of the government in question.

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<sup>14</sup> The *de facto* and legal status of the Republic of Cyprus is controversial due to the changes it went through as a state founded by Turkish and Greek people in Cyprus with the 1959-60 Agreements. This is especially the case with Turkey. Since 1974, there has been a *de facto* bicameral structure in Cyprus with two different governments being on duty in two different regions where two different peoples live. Although the UN has recognized the Cyprus Greek Administration as the only legitimate state of the island, this does suffice to explain the *de facto* situation. In this context, the Cyprus Greek Administration, which is recognized as the Republic of Cyprus by the EU too, is named "Cyprus-GA" and the Cyprus Turkish side is named Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

## 1. TGNA 19. Term<sup>15</sup> (19-4, 19-5. Legislative Years): September 1994-December 1995

### a. General Political Situation: 1994-1995

Serious changes occurred in political staffs after the sudden death of Turgut Özal, the President, on 17 April 1993. The most important of these was that of Süleyman Demirel's, the DYP leader, becoming the President on 16th May of 1993 after Turgut Özal had passed away. After Demirel had become the President, Prof. Dr. Tansu Çiller won the election and became the president of the DYP, and then became the Prime Minister of the Government established as a coalition with the SHP (which was later changed as CHP), which was founded on 25 June 1993 and ended on 5 October 1995, for 2 years and 4 months. In the program of the government under the presidency of Tansu Çiller, it was clearly stated that CU (Customs Union) was perceived as a means of joining EU for Turkey and serious effort would be spent about this matter.

*"Our government will make the maximum effort to improve our relations with the EC in the direction of full membership and to make Turkey have a place in the context of security and defense identity as a full member. The fulfilment of CU which is anticipated to come into effect in 1995 will be an important milestone of our effort."*

In the programme, about the relations with Greece, the statement was as follows:

*"We wish relations between Turkey and Greece to be brought to a level compatible with the interests of both countries in the long-run. There are dual matters, as known, some of which are connected to each other and waiting for resolution. We have the hope that just and peaceful solutions will be found through a meaningful dialogue and mutual political will."*

Here, it was underlined that problems with Greece needed to be settled with "dual dialogue and good intentions"

The period between 1994 and 1995, there were 178 deputies from the DYP, 88 deputies from the SHP, 115 deputies from the ANAP, 62 deputies

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<sup>15</sup> TGNA 19. term started with the election held on 21<sup>st</sup> of October 1991. However, 19<sup>th</sup> term, 4th and 5th Legislative Years are evaluated in this paper since the research concerns the period after 1994.

from the RP and 7 deputies from the DSP in the parliament which consisted of 450 seats.

It could be said that the most important matters Turkey faced in this period are the terror caused by PKK, generation of a serious tension out of discussions about religion-secularism-regime, problems in economic and fiscal structures. It is possible to talk about two key reasons for the government's, under the presidency of Tansu Çiller, enthusiastic approach to the issue of the EU. First of these is the decision of EU concerning expansion with a set of criteria determined in the Copenhagen Summit in 1993 and the attraction of great interest due to this decision. Almost all the countries in the Middle and in the Eastern Europe have maintained a political attitude about being a member of the EU. Turkey, which has been in close touch with the EU (EEC/EC) since 1959, suddenly has fallen outside of the expansion process, practically has come to be defined as "the other" of the new identity definitions within the EU. It was clearly understood that neither relations which were improved with Ankara Treaty in 1963 nor application of full membership in 1987 had much effect. In the same time, lack of developments as exciting as the ones at the beginning of 1990 in Turkey's internal affairs led to the return of the EU project back to spotlight, in a more significant fashion, once again. Turkey decided, in order to join the expansion process or at least not to be detached from the process, to complete CU, which was mentioned in Ankara Treaty and schedule of which was determined by the Additional Protocol that came into effect in 1973, in 1995 and tried to be involved in the expansion process. "A country that constructed the EU and CU cannot be left out of the expansion process" approach became the most important argument of government led by Tansu Çiller and a new EU campaign, a very extraordinary one, was launched in Turkey for this purpose. Tansu Çiller, repeating the sentence "I'll be the one to make Turkey enter the EU", would prefer to see political, fiscal and economic risks that accomplishing CU, without being a member of the EU, would bring as "secondary" issues. At this point, two particular points must be underlined. Firstly, in the context of new climate emerging in Europe in 90's, Turkey had extremely high risk of being left out of the expansion process of the EU. In this sense, it was a fairly understandable situation for Turkey, which embraced the EU as a civilization project, to be concerned and to try to be involved in the expansion process with every kind of political means and maneuver possible. Secondly, CU was a necessity, beyond the choice of Turkey, for the agreements made with the EEC/EC. The EU side fulfilled the most of the obligations in the 22 years-long process, but considering the competition power of Turkish industry with respect to that of the EU, it was expected from Turkey to

complete its obligations by extending them over time, but to fulfill all the obligations in 22 years time at most. In this sense, the effort Turkey produced for CU should be viewed as an obligation based on agreements. But the idea that personal political choices and enthusiasm of Tansu Çiller created imbalance between expectations and the means to satisfy those expectations is the one that finds acceptance.

An important part of the enthusiasm of the Tansu Çiller Government, almost like panic, about the EU and CU was related to the developments concerning Cyprus issue. That is because Cyprus Greek Administration applied to EU for membership with the name of "Republic of Cyprus" and with the claim that it represented the whole island. In spite of all the notices from United Nations and Turkey, community decided to evaluate this application within the usual process on 11 September 1990. The declaration of Greece about vetoing all the expansion the EU will make towards Middle and Eastern Europe in the case of excluding Cyprus from the expansion process demonstrated its effect and the EU published its opinion stating that Cyprus had the required conditions for the full membership in June 1993.<sup>16</sup> It could be accepted that a political panic was also experienced in Turkey about this issue.

There was an internal basis for the enthusiastic moves that overemphasizes the issue of EU. Çiller, who made the promise "Making Turkey a contemporary European country", was blaming all the opposition criticizing the project, led by Erbakan's Welfare Party, and was declaring them as the enemy of secularism and regime, also using this "trump" in the discussions with the EU. She tried to gain internal political advantage, considering the upcoming elections at the end of 1995, through "the alarming scenario" which she put as "If the EU does not support political groups that are adherent of the West, like us and if secular, modern groups do not support us, fundamentalists will come to power". But in 1995, Çiller faced serious erosion in the foreign and in the domestic support. This situation, at the end of the year, also reflected on the General Elections on 14 December 1995 and Çiller, despite seeing herself as "the politician to make Turkey enter EU", did not get the adequate support from the society; moreover number of seats of the DYP dropped from 178 to 135. On the other hand, the ANAP, opponent of the DYP,

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<sup>16</sup> A similar event occurred concretely in 1997 too. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece T. Pangalos declared that Greece will veto the expansion of EU towards East Europe, even though it was declared by EU on 24th July 1997 that resolution to the matter of Cyprus is a condition that needs to be satisfied in order for Cyprus to gain the right to full membership of EU. Later, Cyprus was declared to be the one of first countries to be a member in the first expansion of EU in the Agenda 2000 report about future of EU prepared by EU Commission and after that, in the Luxemburg Summit in December 1997. Greece succeeded in imposition of its policy to EU.

increased its number of seats in the parliament from 115 to 132. The RP, headed by Erbakan, the target of Çiller's accusations and the main reason of her for asking for domestic and foreign support, had a blast in the elections and increased its number of deputies from 62 to 168. In other words, the results of the elections revealed Çiller's EU strategy did not work.

#### **b. Protocol Summaries: September 1994- November 1995: TGNA 19-4 and 19-5. Legislative Years:**

This part in which the last two years of the TGNA formed by the general elections held on 21st October 1991 is discussed, contains 19. term, 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Legislative Years. 26 sessions (the TGNA Sessions) in which the matters of Cyprus and Greece were touched upon are detected and approximately 2000 pages of protocol have been examined. In this period, three different governments, under the presidency of Tansu Çiller, have officiated. The first of these governments (50<sup>th</sup> Government) is the coalition of DYP-SHP<sup>17</sup>. After this government, the DYP government, which lasted for only 25 days, officiated. Finally the DYP-CHP coalition took over the administration. The construction of CU and Kardak-Imia crisis happened in ruling term of this government.<sup>18</sup>

In these years, the most crucial issue of foreign and also internal politics in the TGNA discussions is CU which will be completed with the EU and, linked to the EU, relations with Greece. Cyprus matter was also mentioned as an inseparable part of this process. As relations with Greece came up through the issues of the EU and Cyprus, Turkish minorities in Western Thrace, the continental shelf in Aegean were among the matters discussed frequently in mutual relations in this period of time. Matters of CU and Cyprus especially intensified on the acceptance of South Cyprus Greek Community as a member to the EU and obstructive role of Cyprus matter for Turkey on efforts to join the EU. The opposition parties accused the party in power of making concessions in order to surpass the obstacle of Greece's veto for the admission to CU, especially the meeting held in London, which four EU-member countries and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey were present, on 2 February 1995 was pointed out. According to the opposition, the path to application of Cyprus GA for full membership to EU, which was kept in suspense due to the problems in

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<sup>17</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs changed for four times due to the changes in SHP side of 50th Government. These four Ministers of Foreign Affairs are: Hikmet Çetin (SHP-CHP), Mümtaz Soysal (SHP) Murat Karayağçın (SHP) Erdal İnönü (CHP)

<sup>18</sup> The coalition Tansu Çiller formed with CHP, led by D. Baykal, remained in office until 6 March 1996, since a government could not be established after the general elections held on 24 December 1995.

Cyprus and Turkey's objection, was opened.<sup>19</sup> The deputy of the ANAP Kamran İnan, in his speech on 3 November 1995, links the withdrawal of Greece from its objection to CU after this meeting to the change in Turkey's policy of Cyprus.<sup>20</sup> Same concerns are spoken out by the representatives of the opposition parties.<sup>21</sup> For instance, *"The subject regarding the participation of Turkey in CU which was derived from the agreements cannot be left to Greece to decide. Turkey cannot accept our rights to be abused by Greece's political desires. Existence or lack of Greek veto is none of Turkey's concerns. Turkey is not a party in the efforts about this issue"* says B. Ecevit, leader of the DSP. In his another speech, Ecevit would say *"What happens if Cyprus becomes a member before Turkey does so; first of all, the connection of Cyprus Turks to Turkey breaks; Enosis virtually comes true between Cyprus and Greece and in Enosis process, Turks will be either molten or exposed to the threat of genocide; in that case, it is the whole European Union, not just Greeks, that Turkey comes face to face with "*<sup>22</sup>

The MHP representative Muharrem Şimsek speaks his concerns as: *"Nobody can claim that the West which wants us to leave Cyprus to Greece today, will not assert the segmentation of Turkey for full membership tomorrow. Turkey will have made a historical and national mistake if, in return for withdrawal of Greece from its veto against admission of Turkey to CU, accepts the beginning of negotiation of Cyprus Greek Administration with the EU for full membership"*. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, speaking on behalf of the BBP shares his opinions as: *"CU, in principle, leads Turkey to suicide anyway. We hold the opinion that while going to the suicide; it would not be of strong character to sign our suicide pact by making other concessions. This matter cannot be related to Cyprus issue in any way"*. On the other hand, Engin Güner who speaks

<sup>19</sup> This claim took part in European press. See.: The Times: 8.12.1995

<sup>20</sup> TGNA Protocol: (03 Kasım 1995) (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:19. Dönem 5. Yasama Yılı, 22. Birleşim (3 Kasım 1995)) Kamran İnan (MP): *"In the meeting, with the participation of four Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Europe and one from Turkey, held in London on 2 February 1995, the message that Turkey will not object to proceeding of the application of Cyprus for full membership to the EU which was done in 1990 and has been kept in suspense since then, was delivered and thus a bargain was initiated. The admission of Cyprus's full membership application to the EU, in return for withdrawal of Greece from its objection against entrance of Turkey to CU, and four days ago, as a matter of fact, Greece announces no objection against Turkey on the issue of CU. This statement is made because Greece loves Turkey so much? Or is it perceived as the success of the the policies pursued; no, it is because Greece and Southern Cyprus saw that the path to Enosis has been opened and again pay attention, Southern Cyprus has not made the most minor efforts for resolution in the negotiations. The meeting on 2 February reflected on the EU Council of Ministers held on 6 February and Mr. Juppe, the then President of the EU and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, declared clearly: In order to eliminate the opposition of Greece to admission of Turkey to CU, it has been decided to admit the application of Cyprus for full membership in the second half of 1996"* so it was confirmed and now when we look at the document and encounter the same decisions."

<sup>21</sup> TGNA Protocol: 21. February 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem 4.Yasama Yılı 77. Birleşim)

<sup>22</sup> TGNA Protocol: 1 March 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem 4.Yasama Yılı, 81.Birleşim)

on behalf of ANAP emphasizing that matters are between Turkey and Greece and EU should not interfere by saying: "See what the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France Alain Juppe, behaving like a spoiled little boy, says to Greece, which tries to get all the concessions with so-called an expression of objection: "If you veto Turkey's entry to CU, we'll reject your application of Cyprus for full membership". In other words, there is a relationship, even if it is an inverse one, established. However, they have no right to do such a thing"<sup>23</sup> Abdullah Gül, speaking on behalf of the RP, claims that Turkey has no space for maneuver in the future, by saying: "Moving of Cyprus case to Brussels was something that Greece was trying to do, for years, anyway and now it is indirectly accomplished".<sup>24</sup>

In his response to the criticisms, M. Karayalçın, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, states that the EU approached, in Dublin Summit held on 26 June 1990, to the issue of Cyprus only with the parameters of Cyprus Greek Administration and the process for the membership of Cyprus began on this date.<sup>25</sup> In Karayalçın's opinion, an important step about the matter of Cyprus has been taken and the concepts like "bi-zonality", "bicameral structure" and "federal resolution", which are the arguments of Turkey, are spoken about in the meeting on 6 February 1995.<sup>26</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Karayalçın says in his speech in the TGNA on 21 February 1995, with the purpose of eliminating the discomfort the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in London on 2 February created, "If Cyprus Greek Administration enters the EU; Turkey will implement its decision which is the complete integration with Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, integration will definitely be applied. This has to be recognized as an inevitable consequence of such a development."<sup>27</sup> This idea suggested by Karayalçın was supported by all the political parties in power and in opposition (DYP, CHP, ANAP, BBP, DSP, and MHP) and it became a state policy to go for a complete integration with TRNC in case of admission of Cyprus-GA to the EU. This

<sup>23</sup> TGNA Protocol: 1 March 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem 4.Yasama Yılı, 81.Birleşim)

<sup>24</sup> TGNA Protocol: 8 March 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem 4.Yasama Yılı, 81.Birleşim)

<sup>25</sup> TGNA Protocol: 21 February 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem, 4.Yasama Yılı, 83.Birleşim)

<sup>26</sup> Karayalçın, in the parliament, revealed the letter which he sent to Alain Juppe, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, one day after the meeting on 2 February 1995. The statements in the letter was as follows: "Dear Mr. Minister, I would like to express my concerns and my views, as a confirmation of my remarks I made in fivefold meeting yesterday on the issue of possible membership of Southern Cyprus to EU once again to the attention of excellencies. ..I would like to state that it would be inevitable for my Government to go for a complete integration with Northern Cyprus in the case of determination of a date which EU will initiate negotiations with EU or a time period as such and announcement of this development" Bu this letter, let alone end the speculations, created serious doubts especially because of the date it was written and the view that the letter was completely written for internal politics purposes in a prearranged fashion. TGNA Protocol :21.2.1995.

<sup>27</sup> TGNA Protocol : 21 February 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem, 4.Yasama Yılı, 83.Birleşim)

act stated that there could be a consolidation between Turkey and TRNC if Cyprus-GA is admitted to the EU. The common view expressed by all the parties in the context of Cyprus and EU is the rights and the authorizations derived from 1960 Zurich-London Treaties. According to these treaties, Cyprus cannot be involved in the international pacts, in the international treaties and in the international foundations which Turkey and Greece are not present together. However, Greece still pushes for the entrance of Southern Cyprus Greek Community to the EU. In the course of taking the decision regarding the possible consolidation of Turkey and TRNC, ruling parties the DYP and the CHP, although they approve such a consolidation in principle, stand deliberately with the grounds "Relations with Greece will be damaged and it will place Turkey in difficult circumstances against the EU" whereas insistence of the opposition parties on making the consolidation with TRNC as extensive as possible and materializing the consolidation right away without waiting for decisions of the EU attracts attention.

The TGNA Protocols clearly demonstrate, even though the matters of Cyprus and Greece are treated in a "national manner" with a climate of agreement, the main distinction is related to being "in power" or "in opposition". While the parties in power, which are aware that the part of the matters of relations with Greece and Cyprus is linked to the issue of the EU, prefer to come to terms with Greece, especially on the subjects regarding the EU, it can be observed that the opposition prefers "the hawk" policies and accused the Government of not attaching adequate importance to the national interests. In this context, it is seen that the Government attaches importance to "Europeanization" and is sensitive to EU in the course of policy determination about Greece and Cyprus.

The harshest attitude in the opposition comes from the Nationalist Movement Party. For example, the speech of Muharrem Şimşek, speaking on behalf of MHP, in which he says "*Nobody can claim that the West which wants us to leave Cyprus to Greece today, will not assert the segmentation of Turkey for full membership tomorrow.*" and his representation of the EU as "evil West" clearly summarizes the view of the party on Europeanization.<sup>28</sup>

Abdullah Gül, in his speech as deputy, criticizes both the EU and the government, accuses the government of letting Southern Cyprus enter EU and of taking the matter of Cyprus to the EU. The DSP, a nationalist party under the presidency of Ecevit who executed the 1974 Cyprus interventions, on the other hand, states that the admission of Cyprus to

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<sup>28</sup> TGNA Protocol: 21 February 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem, 4.Yasama Yılı, 83.Birleşim)

the EU as a whole before admission of Turkey to EU, even if the matter of Cyprus is settled, is against the 1960 London Treaty and expresses that Government has not been sensitive enough in these issues. Ecevit- from the opposition party- suggests federation discussions to be ended, Cyprus case to be closed and a autonomy relationship to be constructed between Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Republic of Turkey. According to Ecevit, too, entrance of Cyprus Greek Community to the EU means taking the Cyprus matter to the EU.

Common thinking in the TGNA is to find a solution to the Cyprus matter through negotiations with the UN, not through the EU. That is because presence of Greece in the EU, as a country having the right to veto, gives Greece the possibility to manipulate the position of the EU on Cyprus issue. Necessity of resolution to Cyprus matter as a precondition in the course of Turkey's admission to the EU might encourage Turkey to make more efforts to solve the problem and might also encourage Turkey to be relatively more flexible in the debates. This point can be evaluated in the context of relations with Greece, too.

The importance attached to the EU, in the context of preventing Turkish foreign policy from diverging from the path of Europeanization is noticed much more clearly in the attitudes of the ruling parties. For instance, it is striking that a member of parliament from the CHP, a copartner of the coalition, said being under the roof of the EU would be beneficial for our relations with Greece because CU, which would be established with the EU, would make both sides closer to each other and would create a dialogue platform in which the matters of Cyprus and Greece could be discussed.<sup>29</sup>

An important date, 6 March 1995, for the debates on EU is the decision of Turkey-EC Partnership Council regarding the completion of CU between the EC and Turkey. The President of the Welfare Party Necmettin Erbakan, who also later would become the Prime Minister, tabled motion of censure about CU on 2 May 1995.<sup>30</sup> In the motion, Erbakan asserts that government must be suspended because of the CU decision. Erbakan claimed that the decision means "the colonization of the motherland by the West and the total submission of Cyprus to Greece"; moreover, the decision "serves the West's plan for destruction of Islam and intends to destroy the history and the identity of our country". Kamran Inan from ANAP, one of the opposition parties expressing that Cyprus was sold in return for CU decision frequently, says "*Admission of Cyprus's full*

<sup>29</sup> TGNA Protocol: 1 March 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19.Dönem 4.Yasama Yılı 81. Birleşim)

<sup>30</sup> TGNA Protocol: 2 May 1995 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 19. Dönem 4. Yasama Yılı , 107. Birleşim)

*membership application to the EU, in return for withdrawal of Greece from its objection against entrance of Turkey to CU, and four days ago, as a matter of fact, Greece announces no objection against Turkey on the issue of CU.* ”<sup>31</sup>

In the session, which K. İnan criticized the Government, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Deniz Baykal (CHP), makes a declaration which is very striking in the context of "Europeanism" and elimination of conflicts:

*"CU brings the conditions that will make Turkey closer with Greece, as with the other European countries. Now, Greece has to think twice: Are you going to continue to see Turkey as an enemy, as an element of threat, or, are you going to cooperate with Turkey?... The Turkish Nation, the Turkish Governments, the Turkish Parliament have never made concession under foreign pressures about this national case; but, as we all know, all the international matters are resolved with mutual compromise. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has always proved, too, that it is ready to pull its weight.* ”<sup>32</sup>

Another important development in 1995 is the decision about Greece matter approved in 121. Session on 8 June 1995. The text, approved with consensus before being put to vote since it is a common proposal, contains very harsh expressions. The draft touches upon the preparations of Greece about increasing its territorial waters to 12 miles and states if this change happens, Turkey will not recognize it, moreover will take this as "casus belli". The draft goes exactly as below:

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<sup>31</sup> TGNA Protocol: 03 Kasım 1995 Kamran İnan (MP): *"In the meeting, with the participation of four Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Europe and one from Turkey, held in London on 2 February 1995, the message that Turkey will not object to proceeding of the application of Cyprus for full membership to the EU which was done in 1990 and has been kept in suspense since then, was delivered and thus a bargain was initiated. The admission of Cyprus's full membership application to the EU, in return for withdrawal of Greece from its objection against entrance of Turkey to CU, and four days ago, as a matter of fact, Greece announces no objection against Turkey on the issue of CU. This statement is made because Greece loves Turkey so much? Or is it perceived as the success of the the policies pursued; no, it is because Greece and Southern Cyprus saw that the path to Enosis has been opened and again pay attention, Southern Cyprus has not made the most minor efforts for resolution in the negotiations*

*The meeting on 2 February reflected on the EU Council of Ministers held on 6 February and Mr. Juppe, the then President of the EU and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, declared clearly: In order to eliminate the opposition of Greece to admission of Turkey to CU, it has been decided to admit the application of Cyprus for full membership in the second half of 1996" so it was confirmed and now when we look at the document and encounter the same decisions.*"

<sup>32</sup> TGNA Protocol: 03 Oktober 1995 (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı:19.Dönem 5.Yasama Yılı, 22. Birleşim)

**"Turkish Grand National Assembly, in its 121st Session on 8 June 1995, discussed the situation which the Greek Parliament made applicable for Greece side, by approving United Nations Maritime Law Treaty, and adopted the statement below.**

**The balances on the shared sea Aegean were established with Lausanne Treaty on 24 July 1923. On that date, the territorial waters of each country was determined as three admiralty mile. In this case, the open seas area excluding the national sovereignty territory constituted %70 of Aegean.**

**Greece, on 8 October 1936, took 43,68 percent of Aegean, almost half of Aegean, under its control by increasing its territorial waters to 6 admiralty mile. But, Turkish territorial waters, which was increased to 6 admiralty miles in 1964, covers only %7 of Aegean, half of the Aegean still remains in the status of open seas.**

**Greece, lastly, taking advantage of some decrees of Maritime Law Agreement which are actually designed for open seas and oceans, suggested expanding its territorial waters to 12 miles. In case this suggestion comes true, Greece will have taken approximately %72 of Aegean Sea under its control.**

**It is inconceivable for Turkey, a peninsula, to accept such a circumstance which will cause it to reach seas and oceans of the world by getting through Greek territorial waters. Turkey has vital interests in Aegean. Turkish Grand National Assembly has decided to announce Greek and world public that, hoping Greece Government will not adopt the decision of increasing its territorial waters beyond 6 miles which will break the balance established in Lausanne, all the authority, including military ones considered necessary, will be invested in the Government of Republic of Turkey, with purposes of preserving and defending the vital interests of our country in such a case "<sup>33</sup>**

Even though the statement in question is "announced to Greek and world publics with amicable sentiments", it was put to spotlight frequently by

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<sup>33</sup> TGNA Protocol: 08 June 1995 (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı: 19. Dönem 4. Yasama Yılı, 121. Birleşim (08 Haziran 1995))

Greece as an example of Turkey's hostile attitude. The debate of this issue in Turkey, on the other hand, begins after a speech by B. Arınç, the President of the Assembly, stating that the decision in question harmed the peace in Aegean and the decision of regarding the increase in Greek territorial waters to 12 miles as an act of war (casus belli) can be reconsidered.<sup>34</sup> In his second statement, Arınç, receiving serious criticisms including the ones from his own party, says: *"I am the president of the assembly. The common conception for me and for everyone else is this: Common objective of Turkey in foreign politics is to protect and to guard our common interests. I, too, believe that national interests have priority above all else. Our national interest necessitated such a statement to be made in that time. I certainly respect this decision because it is the will of the Assembly. But we need the relations with Greece, between both the parliaments and the governments, to be enhanced. They also need this enhancement, as we do. If we still keep on discussing a declaration which was met with applauses, yet did not become a decree, we have to think about what it'll bring and take away too"*<sup>35</sup> But the statements by the President of TGNA B. Arınç created disturbance within the Government too and, for instance, A. Gül, Minister of Foreign Affairs, would say "Preliminary discussions between Turkey and Greece for the resolution of Aegean matters continue, it is our hope to solve the problems in harmony of interests of both sides but a new attempt in Aegean matters should not be expected for now."

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<sup>34</sup> Milliyet (Daily Newspaper-Istanbul) : 8 April 2005.

<sup>35</sup> Süddeutsche Zeitung: 09.04.2005; Die Presse: 14.04.2005.

## **2. TGNA 20. Term (20-1, 20-2, 20-3, 20-4. Legislative Years): January 1996- April 1999**

### **a. General Political Situation: 1996-1999**

The enthusiasm and the insistence of the Government, under the presidency of T. Çiller, about CU were partly related to the General Election which was to be held 24 December 1995. Claiming "the female politician accomplishing Turkey's entrance to EU", T. Çiller made the issue of CU the most important element of her political campaign. There were two addressees of Çiller's use of the EU as main instrument of the election campaign: M. Yılmaz and the RP. Çiller hoped to gain advantage against the ANAP, under the presidency of M. Yılmaz, which run in the same track in the elections with the DYP. Çiller's second target was the RP, under the presidency of N.Erbakan, which clearly defended an anti-EU policy and caused disturbance both in Turkey and in EU in the context of "regime" and "secularism" debates that increased the tension in Turkey. Çiller was trying to present the EU, which she perceived as a "modernization" policy, as a barrier against the parties that are "unprogressive, fundamentalist and enemy of regime", she mentioned this especially in Europe frequently. According to Çiller, if the West does not support a politician like her, it will have supported an anti-West regime. It could be argued that this political-tactical approach of Çiller created a positive effect in Europe in the beginning. But especially some developments in 1995 created doubts about her credibility in the EU, many European politicians, who supported her before, accused her of promoting an enthusiastic nationalism, while horrifying about the threat of religious state.

The decision for CU to be completed on 31 December 1995 is adopted with no.1995-1 decision by the Turkey-EU Partnership Council on 6 March 1995, but a serious tension, especially in the subject headings of Greece and Cyprus, has been experienced with the EU before this date and also in the period until 31 December 1995. As Kamran İnan, the deputy from the ANAP, also expresses in the session on 3 November 1995, the pressure on the issue of Cyprus applied by Greece on both Turkey and EU for accomplishing Turkey and CU worked out.<sup>36</sup>

Both the personal approach of Çiller and also the problems of "persuasiveness" on the issue of CU, in addition to no satisfactory

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<sup>36</sup> See footnote 15.

improvement in the matters like corruption, economic-fiscal problems and terror, were reflected onto the elections too. It was DYP, headed by T. Çiller, which faced the greatest drop of the elections with 8%.

The new panorama formed after the elections at the end of 1995 caused experiencing of a very inconsistent and chaotic 20. term for three and a half years. Four different governments were established in this period, but the most astonishing one was that of T. Çiller's, who transformed the policy of the EU-CU into a campaign against the Islamist threat in Turkey, coalition with the RP which she illustrated as an element of threat both for the West and the regime in Turkey. Çiller, who collaborated with the ANAP in a coalition, determined to terminate the coalition when the ANAP supported the corruption crinations against her too. Then, Çiller, after accepting the offer from Erbakan who was assigned to the task for establishment of government once again, served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Secretary in the Government constructed by the DYP-RP. This government was ended as a result of the pressure from the military and civil bureaucracies on the grounds of "regime concerns" (This is named as "28 February Process" in Turkey) after a year of service. The opinion that Çiller lost prestige both in Turkey and in abroad by constructing a coalition with the RP, the party which she demonstrated as a threat, in this process finds common acceptance.

But the main event concerning the relations between Turkey-Greece and EU is the crisis of Kardak-Imia which happened when Ciller's government was temporarily in power until the new government would be established. On 25 December 1995, just one day after the elections, the developments initiated by a stranded ship with Turkish flag on Kardak islets in Aegean brought Turkey and Greece on the brink of a serious war, after raising of Greek flag first and followed by raising of Turkish flag. The involvement and enthusiasm of Çiller, who continued to serve as the Prime Minister of a minority government until 6 March 1996 because the new government could not be established due to the complex picture formed in the elections, even intensified the crisis, calls of the EU did not work, finally crisis was overcome as the USA stepped in.<sup>37</sup> Kardak Crisis has elucidative

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<sup>37</sup> After exactly one month after the crash, on 26 January 1996, Mayor of Kalimnos Island and priest and families of the island went to Kardak islets, on which there is no settlement, with a shooting crew from Antenna (a Greek television channel) and run up the Greek flag and returned. After the broadcast of the incident on television, two reporters from Hürriyet, one of the most important newspapers in Turkey, went to Kardak islets and lowered the Greek flag, again in front of the cameras, and raised Turkish flag. On 28 January 1996, the government in Greece, being unable to withstand the pressure, sent a military troop to Kardak islets. The heavily-armed Greek troop which lowered the Turkish flag on the islet was deployed on the larger one of the islets. On the same day, Turkish Ambassador was invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece and was informed that the islets belonged to Greece and the firing will be opened to those who come near to the islets. Turkey bitterly protested this situation, requested

attributes when examined in the context of "Europeanization". Kardak Crisis, as Birand also put it, constitutes one of the landmarks in Turkey's relations with the EU.<sup>38</sup> Greece, making use of the advantages provided by Çiller, succeeded in getting the EU on its side.<sup>39</sup>

The Commission<sup>40</sup> on 7 February 1996 and then the EP accused Turkey with severe statements and supported EU-member Greece.<sup>41</sup> A very similar declaration on behalf of the EU was made after the EU Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs held on 24 July 1996. This declaration includes the expression that EU and Greece are "naturally" in solidarity, but EU is also in close relationship with Turkey which is the neighbor Greece has issues with.<sup>42</sup> The common characteristic of the declarations was the perception of the issue of the EU as the "provocative" violation of Turkey towards a member state "which they are naturally in solidarity". More importantly, the EU was talking about EU territory, possibly a historical declaration, and stressing that Turkey's violation was not only towards Greece, but towards the whole EU: "Greece's borders are also part of the external borders of the EU".

After the Kardak/Imia crisis, Turkey was not only condemned verbally but was also subjected to financial sanctions. The financial supports the EU had to give Turkey were blocked with the efforts of Greece and Turkey, one of the founders of the EU and CU which Turkey is not a member of, was also deprived from the financial support specified for the fiscal-economic disadvantages expected in transition period.<sup>43</sup>

Other important developments between 1996-1998 that affected the relations between Turkey and EU are as follows:

In this period, a process called "28 February Process" occurred and serious difficulties were experienced in democratic sense in this course.

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the retraction of Greek troop and Greek flag, moreover Çiller clearly put that an armed conflict would be put to perspective if necessary with such statements like "That soldier will leave, that flag will be lowered!", "We do not give away the single pebble from our soil even if we have to die for it." *Hürriyet* ((Daily Newspaper-Istanbul) : 30.01.1996

<sup>38</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand [2001] *Türkiye'nin Avrupa Macerası: 1959-1999*, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, p.495.

<sup>39</sup> According to Birand, too, Greece succeeded in imposing that "aggressive" attitude of Turkey on Kardak issue was towards all of EU. Mehmet Ali Birand [2001] *Türkiye'nin Avrupa Macerası*, p.495.

<sup>40</sup> "Commission declares its total solidarity with EU-member Greece." (*"Die Kommission hat ihre volle Solidarität mit Griechenland bekundet, das Mitglied der Europäischen Union ist."*) Bulletin EU: 1/2-1996, 1.4.97.

<sup>41</sup> European Parliament Decree: European Parliament: *Resolution on the provocative actions and contestation of sovereign rights by Turkey against a member state of Union, 14 February 1996.*

<sup>42</sup> Bulletin EU: 7/8-1996, 1.4.27

<sup>43</sup> "... Council (with Turkey) wishes for regulation which will state the financial cooperation to come into effect as soon as possible." Bulletin EU: 12-1995, 1.33. Also Bulletin EU: 1/2-1996 1.9.3; *ABl. C 65 vom 4.3.1996*, and also Kramer (2001b) *Değişen Türkiye*, s.252.

T. Çiller's establishment of coalition with the RP, which was previously accused of being "against the regime" by other parties and left alone, burst the tension in the country. The endeavors Erbakan's Government to produce policies intended for Islamist countries, even though the government did not completely turn their back on the Western foundations and states, was an obstacle in improving the relations with the EU. In the same period, reaction in the EU towards Çiller and accusing her of losing credibility caused Turkey, almost punished after Kardak Crisis, stand far away from the EU.

The siting of S-300 missiles on 4 January 1997, disturbed the international arena and, of course, sensitive Turk-Greek relations. Turkey declared it will not condone to any action that threaten the security of Cyprus Turks. England and the UN reacted fiercely too. S-300 Crisis has become an important matter in mutual relations between Turkey and Greece and also in relations of Turkey, Greece and Cyprus Greek Administration with EU.<sup>44</sup>

On 24 February 1997, EU, changing its classic approach to full membership of Cyprus to EU, declared a political resolution in the Island is a precondition for full membership of Cyprus to the EU and Greece posted its protests to this declaration. The EU, for the first time, was clearly declaring that Cyprus Turks must also be taken into account about full membership and Cyprus Turks should also be presented in the full membership negotiations. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Theodoros Pangalos, just after this declaration, stated that Greece will veto the expansion of the EU towards East.<sup>45</sup>

In the same period, however, Turkish Governments would never be able to intervene the developments concerning that Turkey will be "sidelined" and left out of the expansion process and on the other hand, Cyprus Greek Administration will be included in the expansion process as "Republic of Cyprus"-the representative of the whole island, in the Agenda 2000, prepared by EU Commission about future and perspectives on expansion of the EU, because of the chaos in internal politics, serious

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<sup>44</sup> In the crisis of S-300 missiles, Yannakis Omiru, the Greek Minister of Defense, after Cyprus-Greece governments had taken the decision to deploy the missiles to Crete due to Turkey's severe reaction, said "We got the votes declaring we'll bring the missiles" and resigned from the cabinet.

<sup>45</sup> Ariane Condellis: Die Presse (Australia): 26.02.1997, Thomas Gack: Stuttgarter Zeitung (Germany): 26.02.1997. Fileleftheros (Nicosia): 24.02.1997.

cracks in democratic structure, violations of human rights due to the struggle against terror and other developments emerged after Kardak.

\* Turkey was excluded from the expansion process when 10 Eastern and Middle Europe country and Cyprus, the states applied for the full membership, were given the green lights after the examination of conditions for joining to the EU in the report called "Agenda 2000 for a Stronger and a Wider Union" prepared by the EU Commission on 15 July 1997.

\* The RP-DYP coalition which was unable to withstand the pressures inside and outside the Parliament, ended after a year with Erbakan's resignation. To replace this government, the ANAP-DSP-DSP coalition government which would remain in office for 1,5 years and be in the Luxemburg Summit, was established under the presidency of M.Yılmaz.

\* With the enthusiasm formed by the close relationship of M.Yılmaz with H.Kohl, the Prime Minister of Germany, expectations about Turkey's inclusion to the expansion process in Luxemburg in spite of the Agenda 2000 flourished but there was no development to meet those expectations. Turkey announced, 5 December 1997, that there was no longer a political dialogue between Turkey and EU on the issues including Aegean, Cyprus and all the possible rapprochements with TRNA, including total integration, were in consideration. The attempt of Cyprus Greek Administration to purchase S-300 missiles made Turkey's reaction much bitter, Turkey received certain degree of support for this attitude. This new condition was also the most important test for "Europeanization" in the sense of overcoming of matters between Turkey and Greece.

\* Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakian Republic, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Cyprus Greek Administration became the states candidate for the full membership after the summit of EU in which presidents of states and governments participated, in Luxemburg on 12-13 December. Turkey, on the other hand, was not mentioned as one of the candidate states but it was confirmed that Turkey was able to become a full member. In the same summit, decision for establishment of a foundation, which was especially designed to create a platform Turkey could also participate in, called "European Conference" was taken but Turkey rejected the idea from the beginning. Conference became nonfunctional when Turkey did not participate in the first meeting held on 12 March 1998 and was later abolished. It was clearly understood that Turkey perceived

Europeanization as EU and did not consider the other platforms sufficient for the resolution of political matters.

\* On 4 March 1998, following the request of the Luxembourg European Council (12 and 13 December 1997), the Commission adopted its Communication on a European strategy for Turkey. The main elements of the pre-accession strategy for Turkey include the approximation of legislation and the adoption of the *acquis*.<sup>46</sup> The Communication also contains initial operational proposals for implementing the strategy. Apart from extending the Customs Union to the service sector and agriculture, the Communication proposes closer cooperation between the EC and Turkey and the approximation of legislation in certain areas. The strategy was welcomed by the Cardiff European Council (15 and 16 June 1998), where it was felt that the Communication, "taken as a package, provides the platform for developing our relationship on a sound and evolutionary basis".<sup>47</sup> But this document did not satisfy Turkey; moreover, Greece's move to block the financial aid became useless.

\* The European Parliament, which has a critical position towards Turkey in the relations, adopted the report emphasizing the re-initiation of the political dialogue with Turkey, considering that the dialogue with Turkey was a necessity for interests of the EU, on 24 June 1998. Actually, this could be taken as an important indicator of what kind of congestions it might cause when Turkey stops the political dialogue with the EU.<sup>48</sup>

\* In September 1998, after an election crucial for Turkey held in Germany, main actor of Turkey's relations with the EU, the Social Democrats seized the power from Christian Democrats. One of the most important targets of the new coalition, which does not exclude Turkey because of its religious-cultural characteristics (very like the conservatives arguing that Turkey has the right to be a member of the EU provided that Turkey satisfies the necessary principles and criteria) in the foreign policy was the re-inclusion of Turkey to the EU process.

\*On 10 November 1998, EU Council initiated the negotiations of accession on the ministerial level for Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Hungary, Estonia, and Cyprus Greek Administration.

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<sup>46</sup> Commission Communication to the Council: European strategy for Turkey - COM(98) 124 final. Also: <http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e40113.htm> (Access: 01.02.2007)

<sup>47</sup> Subsequently, on 17 July 1998, Turkey responded with its own suggestions in a document entitled "A strategy for developing relations between Turkey and the European Union - Turkey's proposals", which is generally in line with the Commission's text.

<sup>48</sup> Neue Zürcher Zeitung: 26.06.1998.

\*On 23 November 1998, Austria in the name of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, published a declaration stating that Italy and EU are in total solidarity about the return of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of illegal separatist terror organization, to Turkey.

#### **b. Protocol Summaries: January 1996- December 1998: TGNA 20-1 and 20-2 Legislative Years**

In this chapter, the first two years of 20th term TGNA formed by the elections held on 25 December 1995 have been examined, approximately 5500 pages of TGNA Protocol of 47 sessions in four Legislative Years (20-1, 20-2, 20-3 ve 20-4) have been analyzed.

At the beginning of this period, the DYP-CHP coalition remained in the office until 6 March 1996 since the new government could not be established yet. Kardak-Imia crisis that brought Turkey and Greece on the brink of war occurred in this period. After this government, the ANAP-DYP coalition was established under the presidency of M. Yılmaz (53. Government), but the personal and the political conflict between T.Çiller and M.Yılmaz made the coalition last just for three months. After this coalition, Çiller was surprisingly involved in the establishment of a coalition government formed by the RP-DYP, under the presidency of Erbakan. (54. Government), but this coalition ended after one year due to the concerns about "regime-secularism" and especially due to the great pressure applied by military-civil bureaucracy. (This period is called 28 February Process) The third Government formed in this period was the ANAP-DSP-DSP coalition under the presidency of M. Yılmaz.<sup>49</sup> This government served for 1,5 years and then minority government of the DSP under the presidency of Ecevit, despite having only 77 seats of 550 seats in parliament, was established for early elections. This minority government would remain in office for 4,5 months but DSP would be the first party in the elections held on 18 April 1999 due to the great political advantage provided by the capture of A.Öcalan.

The period between 1996 and 1998 could be said to be the one of the most negative periods in the sense of Turkey-EU and also Turkey-Greece relations. The matters of Kardak/Imia, S-300, the protests causing deaths in the Island and also the apparent exclusion of Turkey by the EU from the expansion strategy and inclusion of Cyprus GA into the process created a pessimistic atmosphere and it was also reflected on the TGNA.

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<sup>49</sup> The DSP is the party which was founded by the ones who separated from the party due to the pressures towards the DYP after Çiller formed coalition with Erbakan under the presidency of Hüsamettin Cindoruk

In the period of 1996-1998 in the TGNA, issues in the relations with Greece like Aegean matters, Western Thrace, the armament of Aegean islands, the support Greece gives to the PKK are expressed more frequently and "hostile" approach of Greece to these issues is stressed by all the parties. The EU is also discussed often in the parliament and it is expressed by all the parties that Greece used the EU as a means of its foreign policy ("its policy on Turkey") and the EU took the side of Greece in the matters between Turkey and Greece. Many parties states that EU almost submitted to Greece and became an institution which fulfills the policies of Greece. It is a common conception in the parliament that Greece made an apparent effort in order to prevent Turkey's entry to the EU.

In the first session of 20th term 2nd Legislative Year, Süleyman Demirel, the President, states that Greece put unfair obstacles into Turkey's way in the EU and adopted all possible hostile attitudes as a policy.<sup>50</sup> Safa Giray, who speaks on behalf of the ANAP in the 32nd Session of the same legislation year, also criticizes the policies of Greece towards Turkey. According to Giray's views, which other deputies share as a whole, Greece is in process of the armament of the Aegean islands, is violating the bilateral international agreements which set the primary rights of minority in Western Thrace and is supporting the PKK. Giray puts forward that Greece had two goals within the context of "megalo idea". First of these is to fully take the Aegean Sea under control and the other one is to regain its status of 1973 in Cyprus. Greece has extended this approach by keeping Turkey far away from Europe. Greece is trying to increase its territorial waters to 6 miles in order to fully command the Aegean Sea. Giray emphasizes once again that Greece constructed a defense doctrine with Southern Cyprus in order to go back to pre-1974 state, in other words, in order to accomplish Enosis.<sup>51</sup> Turhan Tayan, the Minister of

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<sup>50</sup> "Greece has made a habit of displaying every possible hostile attitude and putting unfair and groundless obstacles into Turkey's way to the several international platforms, especially to the EU." TGNA Protocol: 1.10.1996.

<sup>51</sup> The non-friendly activities that Greece is up to and doing can be summarized as follows: concentrating on armament and modernization projects; In addition to the efforts to exclude Turkey from Europe, making intense efforts to combine the defense of Greece with the EU by emphasizing that the borders of Greece are also the borders of the EU; the efforts to keep Turkey in isolation through propaganda; the excessive armament programme, beyond the purposes of defense, pursued by Greece and Southern Cyprus Greek administration within the context of mutual defense doctrine; the construction of naval and air bases in Southern Cyprus; the aggressive and provocative behaviors which also includes border violations towards Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and efforts to attract the attention from Aegean to Cyprus; intensifying the efforts, for example mutual economy doctrine in March 1996 and mutual culture doctrine in August 1996 towards construction of an integration with Southern Cyprus Greek Administration (Safa Giray speaking on behalf of the MP, 20.dönem 2.Yasama Yılı 32.birlehim 13.12.1996)

National Defense, also expresses that Greece, violating the international agreements, armed Aegean islands and Southern Cyprus.<sup>52</sup>

In the discussions in the TGNA, the view that Greece put obstacles into Turkey's way in the EU is also expressed often and commonly accepted. Hasan Tekin Enerem's, speaking on behalf of the coalition partner DYP, statement "*Greece must stop resorting to the EU for the matters between Turkey and Greece; these matters must be resolved by bilateral agreement*" is in harmony with Turkey's policy of non-interference of the EU on the bilateral issues.<sup>53</sup> The anxiety about this issue can be observed on, for example, Şükrü Sina Gürel from the DSP. Gürel claims the EU will be the addressee of Turkey about Cyprus matter once the Cyprus GA is in the process of full membership to the EU and Turkey's ability and authority to deliver its opinions on Cyprus matter will decline.

Deputies, in meetings in the TGNA, clearly declare their refusal of resolution of Turk-Greek bilateral matters under the roof of EU and that they do not want the EU to be involved. The very basic reason behind the tendency of Turkey to resolve the issues under the roof of the UN and Turkey's effort to keep the EU away from the matters is, undoubtedly, the fact that Greece is a full member having the right to veto. Turkish politicians' main concern is tendency of EU to resolve the matters in favor of Greece, normally, and to want Turkey only to make concessions. EU was never accepted as a platform to settle the issues between Turkey and Greece until 2003.

İrfan Demiralp, speaking on behalf of the opposition party ANAP in 32nd session on 13 December 1996, says negative approach of the EU towards Turkey should not only be linked to the vetoes by Greece and put forth the European Parliament also maintained a negative attitude towards Turkey and presented the meeting, designed as a platform for discussing the matters between Turkey and the EU, which has to be held twice a year and has not been held, for evidence. Similarly, the opposition party BBP also puts forth that Turkey fulfilled its own obligations derived from CU; but in return, the West has not been able to fulfill its own promises yet.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> The Minister of National Defense Turhan Tayan: TGNA Protocol: 13.12.1996 (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı: 20.dönem 2.Yasama Yılı 32.Birleşim).

<sup>53</sup> "Greece must stop obstructing the relation of Turkey with the EU, must not instrumentalize the EU in Turkish-Greek matters. The platform to settle these matters is the negotiations as well as the dialogue between Greeks and Turks (Hasan Tekin Enerem, speaking on behalf of the DYP, TGNA Protocol: 13.12.1996 (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı: 20.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı 32.Birleşim)

<sup>54</sup> TGNA Protocol: 13 .12.1996 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 32. Birleşim)

In this period, the most important issues debated in the parliament are Cyprus-GA's attitude about purchase of S-300 and the conjoint defense doctrine announced by Greece and Cyprus-GA in November 1993. This doctrine, mentioned by National Defense Minister Turhan Tayan in 45th session of TGNA on 14 January 1997, envisages planning of a conjoint military strategy and operations, construction of naval and military bases in Cyprus in such a way that will enable Greece have a critical role in Eastern Mediterranean, improvement of combat ability of Cyprus Greek Armed Forces. Tayan view this doctrine as a part of the Enosis. According to Tayan, the economic alliance will be accomplished through admission of Cyprus-GA to the EU. Another significant point expressed by Tayan is "the warning" about S-300 given to Cyprus-GA and Greece by other allies. *"After the ascertainment of the significant increase in the discussions about the purchase of S-300 missiles, Turkey, the USA, England, the key members of EU have made attempts by the UN and the NATO."* says Tayan, The Minister of National Defense. Consideration of "the key members of the EU", instead of "the EU", as addressee could be viewed as an important indicator of the importance attached to the EU in resolving disputes and concept of "Europeanness".<sup>55</sup>

B.Ecevit, leader of the DSP, in the same session, draws attention to the contribution of the EU to the crisis. "Through the biased policies of the EU, Southern Cyprus does not respond to Turkey's call of dialogue" says Ecevit.<sup>56</sup> What Ecevit means by "the biased" policies of the EU, opening of doors of the EU membership to Cyprus-GA and the adoption of economic embargo to be applied to TRNC.

The motion jointly brought by all the parties in TGNA, with the purpose of supporting the declaration signed by Süleyman Demirel, the President of Turkish Republic and Rauf Denktaş, the President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, was granted on 20 January 1997 with unanimous approval.<sup>57</sup> Although it is still in question whether this motion is a wish or a decree to be carried into execution, the effect it produced was felt for a long time. Apart from the main point that the motion touched upon,

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<sup>55</sup> TGNA Protocol: 14.01.1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 45. Birleşim)

<sup>56</sup> "Until the time two-three years ago, there was a dialogue, on the level of presidencies, between Cyprus-GA and TRNC but after the developments I just touched upon, Greek administration has come to the conclusion that the dialogue is no longer needed and all the well intentioned calls of Mr. Rauf Denktaş to Mr. Klerides, Cyprus-GA leader, has been declined for years; in other words, Cyprus-GA no longer thinks that construction of dialogue with Turks is necessary ; Cyprus-GA maintained the view "I have the EU on the one side and Russia on the other side watching my back, I do not need to construct a dialogue with Turks anymore"

TGNA Protocol : 14.1.1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20.Dönem 2.Yasama Yılı 45.Birleşim)

<sup>57</sup> TGNA Protocol: 22.01.1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 49. Birleşim)

attempt of purchasing S-300 by Cyprus-GA, the fourth and the final articles are also striking:

*"4. The unilateral application of Cyprus-GA to the EU for full membership is contrary to 1960 Treaties. The realization of this application will cause the separation of Cyprus and the responsibility for this will be shouldered by the EU"*

*"Conclusion: External interventions have been proved to complicate the resolution even more. In this national cause, the fact that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Turkish Nation are in complete solidarity has been known by all the world public."<sup>58</sup>*

In the TGNA's decree, the responsibility of the EU on the issues which could be caused by the relation Cyprus-GA, in the name of Republic of Cyprus, established with the EU is emphasized and, on the other hand, it is reminded that the discussions must be closed, with the opinion "External interventions make the resolution more difficult," to the actors apart from Turkey-Greece-Cyprus, especially to EU.<sup>59</sup> Turkey persistently opposes the association of bilateral matters with Greece and Cyprus matter with the EU.

Serious debates in TGNA took place in the 51st Session on 28 January 1997 too. Turhan Tayan attracts attention to Greece's policy of armament and stresses that Greece deteriorated the relations through obstructing the relation of Turkey with the EU, violating the rights of Turkish-Muslim minority in Western Thrace, supporting separatist terror; provoking Cyprus Greeks and its policies of armament of Eastern Aegean islands by violating the decrees of international agreements, even though Turkey wanted to settle the issues with peaceful approach. Kamran İnan, Foreign Policy expert from the ANAP in opposition, attracts the attention of deputies to another very important subject. İnan, after saying blackmail policy applied to the EU for Cyprus by Greece worked, examines the NATO. İnan, stressing that Turkey should support the views suggesting expansion of the EU and expansion of the NATO to proceed simultaneously, says "In return for our admission to the EU, we pave the way for other countries to the NATO". According to İnan, unless this relationship is established, then, conditions for Turkey to use its right to veto against the expansion of the NATO will appear.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>58</sup> TGNA Protocol: 22.01.1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 49. Birleşim)

<sup>59</sup> Similar decisions were taken in TGNA again with joint motion and unanimously on 15 July 1999 ve 6 March 2003

<sup>60</sup> TGNA Protocol: (28 .01.1997) (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 51. Birleşim (28 .01.1997))

Kamran İnan, speaking on behalf of ANAP in 75th session, expresses that visit paid by Kinkel the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, in the context of Turkey-EU relations, was a scandal in the context of Turkey-EU relations.<sup>61</sup> İnan, who criticized setting of being on good terms with Greece and the resolution to the Cyprus matter as the preconditions for the EU and adds that the Turk-Greek relations gradually deteriorated as a result of the support of the EU to Greece. İnan also says, in his another speech, that CU made no positive contribution to Turkey in the issue of EU; one day before the session, Mr. Pangalos the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece discussed some of the expressions in the declaration of joint position which will be presented to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs by all the members of the EU in Luxemburg. The fifth paragraph contains the bilateral relations with Turkey and necessity of taking the issues to the Hague Tribunal is stressed and denotes that Turkey clearly approved of Cyprus's full membership to the EU, in other words withdrew from its objection that Cyprus cannot gain the status of member of an international foundation which Turkey is not a full member of. In the same meeting, Nami Çağan , speaking on behalf of the DSP, criticized the unrealisation of meeting, through the endeavor of Greece, of Association Council which is the most authorized agent of the Partnership relation and the fact that Turkey did not receive the economic support which was arranged to be given, due to the veto of Greece. Kahraman Emmioğlu, speaking on behalf of the Welfare Party, by putting forward that Greece wanted to keep Turkey away from the EU and also did not want to break off the relations completely, expresses his concerns about formation of a great alliance of Greece with the key states in the periphery of Turkey.<sup>62</sup>

The period of the ANAP-DSP-DSP coalition, which came to power on 30 June 1997 under the presidency of Mesut Yılmaz, corresponds to an even more problematic time period in the context of relations with the EU. The efforts of 55th Government of T.R. to modify the acute picture in Agenda 2000, meaning the exclusion of Turkey from the expansion process when including Cyprus-GA as the only legitimate state to

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<sup>61</sup> (Talking about Kinkel) What else did he say: "You cannot enter EU." Yes?!. "A special formula for you..."Every time, for ten years, as if they present the Matutes Plan as sugar candy to us once in a while.. This is disrespectfulness. They remain silent when we ask them "Ok, we do not have the necessary qualifications for full membership, but what about the countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Cyprus?". Moreover, stating twice "In order for you to improve your relations with Europe and to consider EU, you have to be on good terms with Greece..." And I responded to them in the commission "Mr. Minister, it is these kind of statements which make it impossible to resolve the issue. If you expect this country, this government to give whatever Greece asks for, besides it is impossible to completely satisfy Greece, our democracy can generate no government capable of doing such a thing, and it is impossible too" (TGNA Protocol: 1.04.1997 (TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı:20.Dönem 2.Yasama Yılı 75.Birleşim)

<sup>62</sup> TGNA Protocol: 24 April 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 85. Birleşim)

represent the whole island in the name of Cyprus Republic, into the process, would be insufficient. Besides, one of the most serious crises between Germany and Turkey would be experienced when the Prime Minister of Germany H.Kohl, who Yılmaz relied heavily on about this issue, did not give the support Turkey expected. M.Yılmaz would announce Germany responsible for the policy of the EU on Turkey, moreover would accuse Germans of refusing Turkey because of "Muslim" identity and of pursuing the policy of "Lebensraum" towards Middle and Eastern European states. The opposition was also concerned about the developments. For example, Hasan Dikici from the RP puts forward in his speech that EU tried to gain more concessions by making use of concepts like human rights, democratization and "Turkey's fate practically depends on Greece's sense of justice". According to Dikici, in case of the shift of Cyprus matter from grounds of the UN to that of the EU, Turkey and TRNC will definitely be the ones to lose.<sup>63</sup> The adverse events occurred between the EU and Turkey in the second half of 1997 and in 1998 reverberated to Turkish-Greek relations too. This juncture can be clearly observed in the debates in TGNA.<sup>64</sup>

In the period of rule of M.Yılmaz's government, the important event that caused the relations with the EU to be almost broken and brought the matters with the EU to deadlock is the Luxemburg Summit held on 12-13 December 1997. In the summit, initiation of arrangements and negotiations with Cyprus-GA was adopted. But Turkey was not included in the states that were in the expansion strategy of the EU, Turkey's situation, which was only considered in the context of "strategy for preparation for candidacy" was denoted. In the part of the decision concerning Greece, Turkey was asked to adopt measures and to carry out reforms on construction of a satisfactory and stable relationship, the resolution of the matters with peaceful methods, consulting the International Court of Justice if necessary and carrying out the debates on Cyprus issue under the roof of the UN with the purpose of resolving the disputes through the platform of the UN.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> TGNA Protocol: 2 July 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 127. Birleşim)

<sup>64</sup> The decrees of Luxemburg Summit were especially debated in the following sessions: TGNA Protocol: 9 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 85. Birleşim); TGNA Protocol: 16 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı 28. Birleşim); TGNA Protocol: 20 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 32. Birleşim); TGNA Protocol: 21 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 33. Birleşim); TGNA Protocol: 23 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 35. Birleşim); TGNA Protocol: 25 December 1997, (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı 37. Birleşim); TGNA Protocol: 6 January 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 38. Birleşim).

<sup>65</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-1997.

Just after the summit (on 14 December 1997), the official statement of the Government goes on with its comments on the summit and with its new policy after stating that actually capacity of Turkey for full membership was confirmed once again, moreover, the EU assigned the Commission to set a strategy for preparing Turkey for full membership. First of all, it is emphasized that improvement of the relations between Turkey and EU also depended upon the continuation of the political and economic reforms in our country, having a positive and consistent relations with Greece and support given to the negotiations, with the purposes of resolving Cyprus issue, under the control of the UN. The Government states that the EU policies towards Turkey was biased and discriminatory, but Turkey has still preserved its goal of full membership to the EU and the partnership relations with the EU would continue. Yet it is also stated that progress of these relations would depend on the fulfillment of obligations of the EU and Turkey would not discuss the issues, except the ones in the conventional context of the relations, with the EU if the EU preserved its approach and mentality towards Turkey. In the following declarations, the message delivered is that the political dialogue with the EU no longer consists of Turkey's domestic affairs, which are claimed to obstruct the progress of the relations, including Cyprus matter, Turk-Greek relations and human rights. Moreover, it is expressed that Turkey would not attend the European Conference which held its first session on 12 March 1998 in London; CU would be carried out as agreed in the Association Agreements, the proposals that the EU undertook submitting in the conclusion report regarding the use of the opportunities provided by Ankara Treaty and improvement of CU. Thus, it was indicated that the future of relations was dependent on political will to be demonstrated by the EU.<sup>66</sup>

Ecevit,, puts forward in a speech in the TGNA that aim of the EU is to keep Turkey under pressure, not to affiliate Turkey: Ecevit, claiming "*The goal of the EU is to obtain some concessions from Turkey on the issues of Greece, Cyprus and even on the domestic matters by giving Turkey the hope of being an EU member someday*", said Turkey decided not to be involved in a dialogue with the EU and the EU completely lost all the possibilities to keep Turkey under pressure.

Even though there are some accusations between the opposition parties and the parties in power about Luxemburg Decrees, the common attitude in the TGNA is a fret towards the EU. The politicians frequently express that the EU was a pawn taken in by Greece. For example, Çiller says the

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<sup>66</sup> Homepage of General Secretariat for the EU in Turkey: [www.abgs.gov.tr](http://www.abgs.gov.tr) .Accession: 15 February 2007.

biased position of the EU, in favor of Greece, fuels the issues instead of helping resolution. Çiller criticizes the EU has brought the issues to deadlock:

*"I hereby would like to send this message to European countries: Europe is an umbrella of democracy; an ideal in which different cultures can coexist by ostracizing discrimination and embracing tolerance. Missing this concept is the major indicator of the narrow vision of this decision which is also to their disadvantage. I censure this decree and clearly put that: there will be a consequence of the attitude in favor of Greece, not biased or in favor of Turkey, fueling the disputes between Turkey and Greece, not settling them."*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem, speaking about the motion proposed by Saffet Arıkan Bedük from the DYP and his 37 colleagues regarding the arrangement of a general discussion on the policy the Government carried out, especially policies on the EU and Cyprus, declared that the expression in the motion stating "As the recent developments clearly demonstrate, due to the improper policies of the current government, Turkey is being isolated about a national case, as it is the case for that of the EU, which Turkey has the law on its side." is not correct and Turkey will not make concessions on Aegean, on Cyprus or on Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Turkey has never been in the side of the majority anyway and non-isolation could only occur through Turkey's concessions and the revision in its policies. In addition to this, Cem emphasizes Turkey is European and delivers a message to the EU by saying "We do not need anyone's authorization to register as a European country". The speech by Cem, after the Luxemburg Summit, represents Turkey's position: "...*They ratiocinate; hopefully someday, they come to us with an offer that we can accept; but until that day, there is no need for us to discuss the crucial foreign matters like Cyprus, Aegean policies, the relations with Greece or some of our internal affairs with the EU and this has been declared to them...*"<sup>67</sup>

Kamran İnan, speaking in the same session on behalf of coalition party the ANAP, also puts forward EU applies double standard. Southern Cyprus has not been asked to come to terms with Turks before the initiation of negotiations for membership. The EU has not demanded Greece to settle

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<sup>67</sup> TGNA Protocol: 20 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20.Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 32. Birleşim)

its issues with Turkey.<sup>68</sup> Atilla Mutman, speaking on behalf of coalition partner the DSP, expressed that Simitis, the Prime Minister of Greece, turned Turk-Greek bilateral matters into the matters of EU by saying in his speech "Greece is the border country of the EU and especially the matters of Cyprus and Aegean are the matters of the EU" in the Western EU Parliamentary Assembly (1-4 December 1997). As a result of the Luxemburg Summit, the strategy of rapprochement consists of 10 preconditions. Six of them is completely related to the issues between Turkey and Greece but, according to Mutman, Greece imposed its point of view to the EU states, hence, at this point, it is very difficult to resolve these issues with the EU and Greece. Mutman expressed that Turkey came to the point of "we do not need the European Union".<sup>69</sup>

According to Sedat Aloğlu from the DYP, who delivered a speech on 6 January 1998, Greece, which held an irrational correlation as any event positive for Turkey would turn out to be to the disadvantage of Greece, has made it very clear that Greece will veto even the decisions which could be approached more positively. Aloğlu expresses that the EU, planning to solve the problems of 11 candidate states with integration, determined the resolutions to the similar problems as a precondition for Turkey to join the EU and declares the decrees of the EU lacked the vision and are incompatible with its greatness and its position. Altan Öymen, speaking on behalf of the CHP, states the EU could not conduct a fair arbitratorship in the matters.<sup>70</sup>

The Minister of State, Şükrü Sina Gürel, speaking in the session on 21 April 1998, emphasizes that Greece and Southern Cyprus planned to reduce the rights and authorizations through the mechanisms of the EU and, in case of accomplishment of full membership without a resolution, to turn Cyprus issue into the issue of the EU and to confront Turkey with the EU.<sup>71</sup> The view that Greece used its membership to the EU to its advantage against Turkey is also shared by the SP. According to Hasan Dikici, Greece has always used all the facilities, on every possible ground, for the political goals that are against Turkey's interests. The most significant example for this is the request of loan for the housing of

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<sup>68</sup> "Is there a criterion of Cyprus in the Treaty of Rome or in Copenhagen Criteria? Is there an Aegean criterion as such? Is it acceptable that EU, totally taking Greece's side, demands Cyprus as a price and helps Greece make Aegean the Greek inland sea? Did EU ask Southern Cyprus before initiating the negotiations, I wonder, "Go to Northern Cyprus, first of all, come to terms with Turks and then come" ? Did they ever say something like "go and settle the disputes in Aegean with Turks" to Greece; no; the all is requested from us. That is, by its very nature, is double-standard" TGNA Protocol: 20 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 32. Birleşim)

<sup>69</sup> TGNA Protocol: 20 December 1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 32. Birleşim)

<sup>70</sup> TGNA Protocol: 6 January 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 38. Birleşim)

<sup>71</sup> TGNA Protocol: 21 April 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 79. Birleşim)

Greeks on the 11 islands located on the international waters of Aegean. Birgen Keleş, speaking on behalf of another opposition party CHP, underlines the double standard applied by the decrees in the Luxemburg Summit and biased and prejudiced position of the EU towards Turkey's issues with Greece and Turkey's domestic matters. In his speech, Keleş stresses Greece pressurized the other countries in the EU and threatened them, for example to prevent the expansion, and never permitted the relations between Turkey and the EU to improve on any level.<sup>72</sup>

Saffet Arkan Bedük, Deputy of Ankara from the DYP, attracts the attention to the problems in the future by saying "*Consideration of Turkey as non-European is a development which is to cause serious consequences to the disadvantage of Turkey both in Cyprus issue and in Turkey-Greece relations*"<sup>73</sup>.

The Luxemburg Summit created such a serious political impact that it can be called as "Luxemburg Syndrome". In addition to offense and anger towards the EU, this situation led to a self-questioning, "where did we go wrong?" frequently. An important section of the deputies in the TGNA brought the issue to spotlight stating that the problems were mainly caused by the permission to Greece's return to the military power of the NATO after the request from the USA, without any kind of guarantee, granted by the Military Administration which took the office after 12 September 1980 coup. For example, İ. Ertan Yülek from the Felicity Party points to the EU and Greece as the source of problems by saying "*Turkey did not exercise its veto on return of Greece to the NATO; but since then, Greece has encumbered all the relations of Turkey with the EU*"<sup>74</sup>

The key issues of the agenda of Turkey are the events occurred in the period between the exit of Abdullah Öcalan, PKK leader, from Syria and capture of him in Kenya. This period resulted in the formation of rage toward the EU and a serious decline in trustworthiness of the EU. Although the rage in question was, for a while, concentrated on Italy, it was oriented toward Greece when the role of Greece in A.Öcalan's escape and the fact that Öcalan took shelter in Greece Embassy in Kenya were revealed and A. Öcalan was captured with a Cyprus-GA passport. At the beginning, Turkey's attitude toward Greece is extremely harsh. For example, İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, says "*Turkey does not need anyone's approval, definition, witnessing, denomination as terrorist and Greece, in our point of view, is a terrorist state and has*

<sup>72</sup> TGNA Protocol: 16 June 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 102. Birleşim)

<sup>73</sup> TGNA Protocol: 6 October 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 2. Birleşim)

<sup>74</sup> TGNA Protocol: 21 October 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı, 10. Birleşim)

*lost its position to be accepted as addressee in any vital issue.*"<sup>75</sup> Cem, in his speech in the TGNA on 13 March 1999, said *"The landscape revealed by the incident of Öcalan is direful for Greece. It is widely known truth that this state is stuck in the terror swamp, even more than the estimated, up to its neck. Thus, it has become a definite fact that Greece had a huge responsibility in the deaths of thousands of innocent people. No state, especially the EU members, can remain indifferent to this fact that illustrates Greece, caught red handed, is the centre of terror. But unfortunately, it is not possible yet to conclude that Greece learned its lesson and suffered the consequences. The political earthquake shook the Simitis Government; but, this was because of detection of support given incompetently, not because of being caught red-handed while supporting the terror."*<sup>76</sup>

In this period, the common view shared by all the parties is that the EU, which Greece got on its side, subjected Turkey to double standards. Expressions like *"Greece took EU as prisoner"* have been voiced in the parliament. Turkey's decision not to engage in political dialogue with Greece and the EU after the Luxemburg Summit also corresponds to deterioration in Turkey-Greece relations. But at the same time, it can be clearly observed that Turkey pursued a policy of increasing tension in order to carry on its way to the EU by eliminating and even taking support of Greece, which is seen as the obstacle on the path to EU, in its most vulnerable state.

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<sup>75</sup> TGNA Protocol: 21 October 1998 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı, 10. Birleşim)

<sup>76</sup> TGNA Protocol: 13 March 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı, 54. Birleşim)

### **3. TGNA 21. Term (21-1, 21-2, 21-3,21-4. Legislative Years): April 1999-September 2002**

#### **a. General Political Situation: 1999-2002**

As far as Turkey-EU-Greece relations are concerned, the issue that makes its mark on late 1998 and early 1999 is the PKK leader A. Öcalan. Due to Turkey's pressure, Syria had to expel Öcalan in 12 October 1998. Öcalan, going from Syria to Russia first, then from there to Italy, was wanted back by Turkey from Italian authorities; Italians, bringing forward a sentence in absentia given by a court in Germany, rejected this request and made public their will to hand him to Germany. However, the German Government could not undertake the political and security risks that would arise in the country; Öcalan remained in Italy. Rejecting Turkey's insistent requests for Öcalan's return, Italy, began to pressure Öcalan after a while to leave the country for somewhere else and Öcalan had to leave Italy where he stayed for 32 days (12 November-16 December 1998).<sup>77</sup> After he had to leave Italy, the PKK leader had to go to the Netherlands first, then to Russia, then to Greece and finally to Kenya, and began to hide in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi. At this point, Turkey's continuous pressure and pursuit backed up by USA and Israil worked out and Öcalan was captured in Nairobi by Turkish Security Forces and brought to Turkey in 16 February 1999. Found on the PKK leader was a Cyprus passport issued for the name Lazaros Mavros.

That Greece supported Öcalan, who is the leader of a separatist and bloody organization that is declared as a terrorist organization by both USA and the EU makes evident that Greece's politics about Turkey had been rested on "my enemy's enemy is my friend" axis. Causing a political crisis within Greece that resulted in the removal from the office of some of the senior executive bureaucrats and politicians including the Minister of Foreign Affairs Pangalos, this scandal gave Turkey an extraordinary chance, especially after the 1997 Luxembourg Summit. While insistently voicing that Greece should be enunciated as a country that supports terror, Turkey was in fact expecting from Greece, "caught red-handed," an attitudinal change regarding the issues of EU and Cyprus. This situation led to a serious change in Greece's policy towards Turkey. Although the

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<sup>77</sup> A. Öcalan's Italy days in his escaping adventure caused significant tensions for Turkey-EU relations. In 23 November 1998, Austria, in the name of EU Council Presidency, made a public statement of solidarity for Italy's negative attitude against Turkey's request for Öcalan's return.

main reason was to break free from the accusations like "the country that supports terror" or even "terrorist country" claimed by some politicians in Turkey; there were four other important reasons.

1. First of them was about Turkey: One of the essential principals of Greece's foreign policy after it joined EEC in 1981 was keeping Turkey away from EEC/EC/EU and "punishing Turkey" through EU; if not possible, then ensuring that it does not benefit from EU. This policy, however, was not as much significant and effective as it had been before. To the contrary, assuming a leadership role in bringing Turkey into EU and creating a security and peace zone in the region became more attractive for Greece.
2. Greece's one of the most important zones of political conflict related to Turkey was Cyprus. Beginning from 1990, Greece had made effort to make the Cyprus Greek Administration step by step a member of the EU. Given Turkey's rights derived from London and Zurich Agreements, it would not be possible for EU to take Cyprus in as the "Republic of Cyprus" without Turkey's approval by implication at least. It is claimed that in the CU process Turkey abandoned its objections and barriers in 1995. Thus, on the Cyprus issue, Greece got over Turkey in 1995; in 'Agenda 2000' in 1997 Cyprus was offered into the first expansion group; and in December 1997, it was qualified to be a candidate state expected to become a member in 2004. The advantage Greece got regarding the Cyprus issue was irreversible and it was no more possible for Turkey to prevent it.
3. Following the Luxembourg Summit in December 1997, Turkey declared that it cut off its political dialogue with EU including the Cyprus and Aegean problems. Soon, Greece was to realize that this attitude of Turkey towards the EU would have its most negative effect on Greece and therefore it would not have the chance to pressure Turkey. A "candidate" Turkey whose candidacy is extended over a very long period would be much better than a Turkey detached from the EU and particularly angry against Greece. Redefining Greece's interests would require this. In a period of expansion uniting Central and Eastern Europe, presence of Turkey as an ally and a neighbor state benefits Greece most. Greece had gained by means of the EU the "concessions to be gained" from Turkey. In this respect, the rapprochement between Turkey and the EU and even the membership of the former, moreover, the leadership of Greece in this process would increase Greece's prestige.
4. One of the most important aims Greece then had is to join in the monetary union with the EU. This situation required immense

financial resources. If Greece had fewer tensions with Turkey, it could decrease its defense budget and get advantageous for the monetary union.

What was missing for Greece to realize this whole strategy is the support of Turkish public as well as of its own. The humane closeness between the new minister of Foreign Affairs G. Papandreu and his colleague İsmail Cem found its resonance in the policies to a certain degree. The actual opportunity, however, came with a natural disaster, the earthquake in 17 August 1999. The "Earthquake Diplomacy" provided the emotional basis for the leaders on both sides to change their policies. The solidarity and effort Greece put forth for the earthquake resulted in a dramatic change of the approaches, manifested even in the suggestion of a war that had found some public support six months ago. There is no doubt that Greece, through a highly profound and realistic political maneuver, succeeded in turning into its favor its hardships which had been increasing day by day following Öcalan's departure from Syria in October 1998. This can be traced in the debate protocols in the TGNA.

There is also no doubt that it was not only Greece's shame due to the Öcalan issue, which led to Turkey's being announced as a "candidate country" in the EU Council Helsinki Summit held in December 1999. In Germany in September 1998, the German Christian Democrats, who were influential in the December 1997 Luxembourg Summit's decisions about Turkey, lost power; the group that came to power is the Red-Green coalition, which does not object in principal to Turkey's EU membership (particularly in the contexts of religion-culture-history), which even has the view that an EU membership for a stable social order in Turkey based on democracy and human rights will be beneficial for both Turkey and the EU. This brought about the possibility of a change in Turkey-EU relations. The active support of USA under the B. Clinton Government fearing that Turkey, once break up with the EU, would fall apart from the West should also not be forgotten. Clinton's support at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Summit also known as the "Last Summit of the Century" held in Istanbul in 18-19 November 1999 with the participation of presidents and prime ministers from 54 countries was highly effective.

Turkey was granted candidate status in the European Council Helsinki Summit held in 11-12 December 1999. For the first time since 1980 Greece has pursued a positive policy concerning Turkey. In fact, a closer look would reveal that, in terms of both Cyprus and Aegean, Greece "had taken" from Turkey much more than what was given to Turkey in

Helsinki. Nevertheless, both Turkey and Greece were contented in general and Europeanization has been effective for the first time in bringing into relief the crises between the two countries.

If one is to understand the degree to which Europeanization was effectual in the relations between Greece and Turkey, one has to look at the period between December 1997 and December 1999. It can be said that the main factor behind Turkey's approach to Öcalan scandal is also Europeanization. Another important point is that the significance of a "relatively" certain perspective Turkey got from the EU was realized. Being declared to be a candidate, Turkey, after 2000, took institutional, legal and administrative arrangements with an inconceivable tempo and determination. I., II., and III. Harmonization Packages as well as Constitutional changes, arranged with the aim of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, received approval from the TGNA in 19 February, 9 April, and 3 August 2001, respectively.

Although the tension created by the process leading to the Cyprus-GA's membership to the EU continued, Turkey evaluated the crises it had with Greece after December 1999 within the framework of "Europeanization" and this could be explained to public. The reversal of this atmosphere in Turkey happened in 2004. Emphases like "open-endedness," "assimilation capacity," "referendum," "recognition of Cyprus," etc. have created a skepticism in Turkey as to the issue of EU, if not an opposition; and this has obstructed both the continuity of reforms and the brave steps with respect to the foreign policies on the issues of Greece and Cyprus.

**b. The Protocol Summaries: TGNA 21st Term (21-1, 21-2, 21-3 and 21-4 Legislative Years): April 1999-October 2002**

For this section covering the four legislation years (21-1, 21-2, 21-3 and 21-4) during the 21st. Term of the TGNA, in the examination of the TGNA protocols, approximately 7000 pages of protocol from 55 Sessions where the issues of EU, Greece, and Cyprus are discussed are examined.

Covering the period between April 1999 and October 2002, the 21<sup>st</sup> Period of the TGNA witnessed crucial developments like the new form of relationship with Greece established after the capture of A. Öcalan, or the proclamation of Turkey as a "candidate state". Throughout this period, which also brought to light significant hints regarding the analysis of the concept of "Europeanization" in the context of the Turkey-Greece-EU relations, DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government under the presidency of B. Ecevit was in power. Despite being highly fragmented and

problematic, it is this period during which the astonishing legal and administrative arrangements in relation to the issue of EU like the abolishment of capital punishment took place.

In this period, discussions revolved around the EU and Cyprus issues. By the same token, Turkey-Greece relations came up in the context of the EU. Thus, what we have in hand is trilateral relations involving the EU rather than bilateral ones. Apart from that, the issue of Western Thrace Turks came up in response to the minority foundations discussed in relation to the harmonization laws as well as the EU's criticisms against the non-Muslim minority policies in Turkey,

57. Government was established under the Prime Ministry of DSP leader B. Ecevit, who had won a great victory in the elections. The government programme, read in the TGNA in 6 June 1999, says: *"Well-intentioned and constructive attempts will be maintained to solve through dialogue our problems with Greece, especially the ones related to Aegean. In this regard, we expect from our neighbor, Greece, first and foremost to adopt a definite position on the struggle against terrorism including PKK and not to let the EU shadow fall onto our relations"*<sup>78</sup> Apparently, insistent use of the expression "EU shadow" in the Government programme emanates from the annoyance about Greece's use of the EU as a means against Turkey for its own national interests. The effort Turkey has put forth for EU membership has provided Greece since 1981 with a great space for political maneuver in terms of its Turkey policy and this has bothered Turkey. The following excerpt from the Government Programme refers to the conflicts Turkey has had with Greece: *"Turkey's full membership to the EU is its right stemming from the history, the geography and the agreements. We will strive for Turkey's full membership to the EU with the equal rights and status other members have. While taking its place in the process of integration in Europe, Turkey will always continue to protect its national rights and interests with the utmost care."*<sup>79</sup> Referring to the 1997 Luxembourg Summit in the speech he gave in the TGNA, Prime Minister Ecevit expresses how vulnerable Turkey's EU policy is to concessions for Greece: *"With our culture, our history, our geography, we are European; however, we are not only European. We are, at the same time, a Central Asian country, a Middle Eastern country, an East Mediterranean country, a Black Sea country, a Balkan country, partly an African country and for the very reason that we are successful in harmonizing these roots, we have come*

<sup>78</sup> TGNA Protocol: 6 June 1999 (T.B. M. M. Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 11. Birleşim)

<sup>79</sup> TGNA Protocol: 6 June 1999 (T.B. M. M. Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 11. Birleşim)

*to be the key country of the Euroasianization process. In a way, we have to be grateful for the ones that shut the EU's door to our face as they have helped us to realize that the world does not consist of Europe only.* " It is worth noting that Ecevit here questions the logic behind Greece's decisive role in Turkey's EU path: *"The ones opposing our membership put forward Greece as an excuse. Then, this means that tiny Greece has taken the huge EU captive. Which one is exploited by the other against Turkey, is it Greece or is it EU; it is hard to tell actually, maybe both of them."*

Being from the MHP whose nationalistic discourse brought to the party quite a success in the elections and made it the second party in the TGNA, Oktay Vural in his speech in 24 June 1999 accuses Greece of "trying to isolate Turkey from the West and the Balkans, to form an Orthodox axis around Turkey, a united Helen area including Cyprus Greek Administration as well as a solidarity alliance with the countries Turkey has fragile relations with such as Armenia, Iran, and Syria." Vural particularly notes that apart from the Cyprus issue, Turkey and Greece have many other problems such as the Aegean problems, policy of systematic oppression on the Western Thrace Turkish minority, and Greece's support for the activities against Turkey including PKK. "That Greece is a country that supports terrorism is evident. As the MHP, we think that a dialogue without Greece's putting an end to the activities against Turkey and giving up on its support to PKK does not make sense."<sup>80</sup> Orhan Bıçakçıoğlu from the same party, drawing our attention to the latest developments that revealed the connection between Greece and the PKK leader, asserts that "it is not an adequate policy to say 'we won't get into a dialogue unless Greece sorts out this terror issue;' Turkey should teach Greece a lesson." He further states that "if needed, we should respond Greece with arm forces, we should disturb them every now and then, and if necessary, we should sabotage their tourism as they do to ours...when we put an end to this terror, only then Turkey would be a leader country in the world, only then we make both Greece and the EU accept what we want"<sup>81</sup>

During the TGNA sessions held in 26 June 1999 the Cyprus issue was discussed. *"We should explain very well to all parties that the inclusion of Cyprus Greek Administration, with the help of Greece's extraordinary efforts, as the only representative of Cyprus into the process of the full EU membership would make the resolution of the conflict even more difficult,"* says Hüseyin Kansu (a MP from the FP) emphasizing also the

<sup>80</sup> TGNA Protocol: 24 June 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 21. Birleşim.)

<sup>81</sup> TGNA Protocol: 24 June 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 21. Birleşim.)

need for support for the TRNC President Rauf Denktaş.<sup>82</sup> The former Prime Minister and the DYP leader, T. Çiller puts forth similar views and after expressing her annoyance about Cyprus plan of G-8 she warns that "Greece will stand in front of us having the world behind it."<sup>83</sup>

The TGNA, on the occasion of 25th anniversary of Cyprus Peace Intervention, assembled in 15 July 1999 with a special agenda. In the meeting, both the representatives of the Government and of political parties and the TRNC President gave speeches; then the declaration (the TGNA Decision) was published with the conjoint bill and the consensus of all the political parties represented in the TGNA. All the speakers in the TGNA regardless of their position (power-opposition) and the political parties they belong to states that Cyprus-GA's becoming a member of the EU is illegal, but in case it happens, the island will definitely be divided and also that Greece uses international institutions like EU for its own interests and this attitude deepens the conflicts. Speaking in the meeting, the Minister of State responsible of Cyprus S. Sina Gürel from DSP reminds of Turkey's objections to the process of Cyprus-GA's entrance to the EU and then emphasizes that if the membership gets materialized, the Turk-Greek balance will be off-balance, which in turn renders the division on the island permanent.<sup>84</sup> Describing the Cyprus-GA's EU membership as "enosis," the Deputy Prime Minister and the MHP Leader Devlet Bahçeli expresses his worry that this situation implies, regarding the Cyprus issue, a shift of the ground from the UN to the EU. Along similar lines, the FP Leader, Recai Kutan, declares his support for the Government and says: "*Greece's attempts to include Southern Cyprus in the EU as the republic of Cyprus are totally wrong. We ask EU to be more careful on this subject. Cyprus problem can not be solved with these kinds and Turkey will never submit to this fait accompli anyway. By taking Southern Cyprus in, our European friends will only make the resolution of the Cyprus problem more difficult.*"<sup>85</sup> The Deputy Prime Minister and the ANAP Leader, M. Yılmaz, also makes a speech with a similar content. According to him, Greece can not exert pressure on Turkey by means of its EU membership, it realized this fact after the Luxembourg Summit: "*Greek Side believes that it will be able to realize via EU its desire to unite with Greece, a desire that it could not realize through violence and oppression before 1974... In this way, Greece-Cyprus-GA team has planned to pressure Turkey and Cyprus Turkish side, yet they have been quite off the mark as they supposed that Turkey will*

<sup>82</sup> TGNA Protocol: 26 June 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 23. Birleşim)

<sup>83</sup> TGNA Protocol: 29 June 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 26. Birleşim).

<sup>84</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

<sup>85</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

*make concessions about Cyprus for the sake of entering the EU. In response to the historical mistake the EU made in Luxembourg by giving the green light to the Cyprus-GA's illegal application for membership, Turkey gave the appropriate answer right off.*<sup>86</sup>

Speaking in the meeting in 15 July and met with great interest and support in the TGNA, the President of the TRNC, Rauf Denktaş, claims that the EU accepted Cyprus-GA's application by submitting to Greece's black mail; for the Greeks, the priority is not to compromise but to have all of Cyprus under the artificial title of "Cyprus Government," and EU path is a thoughtful step towards this end.<sup>87</sup> Denktaş says: "Murmurs coming from the EU and the decisions taken so far unfortunately supports the Greeks' approach. With this approach that denies Turkey the right to speak, what has been carried out is a plan to abolish Turk's rights on Cyprus through making Cyprus member of the EU that has submit to Greece's black mail. This is what we resist against; our resistance is against the ones who want to keep Turkey away from Cyprus and its region. Our struggle is for the survival and empowerment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, also safeguarding the rights and interests of Turkish Nation in Cyprus and in Eastern Mediterranean, we will never turn away from this goal."<sup>88</sup> For Denktaş, Cyprus's EU membership will pave the way for the annexation of the island by Greece. In this way, a not-openly-declared enosis will take place indirectly within the EU. Denktaş also notes that in case the EU accepts only the Cyprus Greek Administration as a member, the axis of the negotiations made for a resolution on the island will shift from the UN to the EU, where Greece is influential, that is to say the Cyprus issue will become a Turkey-EU problem.<sup>89</sup>

Following Denktaş's speech, the bill in which Cyprus issue is qualified as "a national matter" was accepted by the conjoint bill and the consensus of all the political parties represented in the TGNA.<sup>90</sup> Apart from Turkey's support for TRNC, the following points strike out in the bill:

*"The points below are agreed to be announced to the world public"*

- *TRNC, along with Turkey, has put forth every effort and good intention to find a just and permanent solution that will ensure the existence and security of both societies on the island. In contrast, Greece-Cyprus-GA side has not given up its enosis*

<sup>86</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı 34. Birleşim)

<sup>87</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

<sup>88</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

<sup>89</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

<sup>90</sup> "Due to the 25th anniversary of the Cyprus Peace Intervention, the joint motions of the political party groups represented in the TGNA as to the TGNA's full, unconditional and continuous support for the TRNC" TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

*dream, its aspiration to go back before 20 July 1974, has made a possible compromise more difficult every time by encouraging foreign intervention instead of pursuing negotiations between the parties in concern. Finally, Cyprus Greek Administration's application for EU membership and its acceptance by EU has obstructed the solution process and has paved the way for Greece's entrenchment in Southern Cyprus within the framework of the EU. It is impossible to accept this.<sup>91</sup>*

- *As a result of Greece's endeavors to draw foreign powers into the Cyprus issue Cyprus issue is addressed in the G8s Cologne Summit's final declaration and a call -practically a direction- to the United Nations was announced. We decry and reject it entirely.*
- *In this meaningful anniversary of the Cyprus Peace Intervention ...On the issue of Cyprus as a national cause, the TGNA's full support for TRNC will continue without any interruption or condition. There is no room for doubt on this matter."<sup>92</sup>*

The Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem's speech in the TGNA following his visit to USA in 12 October 1999 shows his high deliberateness on Greece and the EU subjects. "As I said in USA," says Cem, "the problems between Greece and Turkey do not have easy solutions... both countries have not shown any tendency to give up any of their claims "that," they think, "are true"<sup>93</sup>. He also emphasizes that we should not exaggerate the softening between Greece and Turkey, as in fact both countries strive for their own interests, so the point is to find the common interests, if there are any, and ensure a rapprochement on the basis of those interests. He continues: "*I also put the following very clearly before: There has not been so much of a change in Greece's policies and attitudes. The change in Greece is this: The previous Greek foreign policy, the Greek policy a year ago assumed that Greece's interest lies with being in conflict with Turkey, being in tension with Turkey; that is to say, Greece's previous policy equates Greece's interest with being in opposition to Turkey. Greece's current policy, again in the same way, is the foreign policy of Greek interest; however, today, the point at issue is a Greek foreign policy that sees Greek interest in not being in conflict with Turkey, in decreasing the political tension in the Aegean.*"<sup>94</sup>. He notes that the developments regarding the EU issue would provide Turkey with a "candidate" status in Helsinki, which will imply that the EU gives up

<sup>91</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

<sup>92</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 July 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 34. Birleşim)

<sup>93</sup> TGNA Protocol: 12 October 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 5. Birleşim)

<sup>94</sup> TGNA Protocol: 12 October 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 5. Birleşim)

discriminating against Turkey; for him, this should not be exaggerated though, in this sense, they will not negotiate Turkey's national interests: "We are aware and conscious of the fact that Turkey's foreign policy vision is so wide that it is not confined to EU only."<sup>95</sup> It seems that the self-confidence based on the changing atmosphere following the Öcalan case along with the change Greece had made in its discourse about Turkey had an impact on Cem's attitude.

Speaking in the same session, Kamran İnan from the ANAP puts this situation very clearly. Noting that Greece, after its gestures following Öcalan and the earthquake, has begun to create in the EU a kind of an atmosphere that expects Turkey to make similar gestures in turn, he warns that Greece is trying to get advantage almost without making any changes, except stylistic ones, in its national interests and policies. "*It is not possible to be discontent about the recent developments with our neighbor, Greece;*" says K. İnan, "*dialogue is very useful indeed, especially between neighbors; however what we have here is rather a change in style; there is no change regarding the goals. ... We have been particularly contented with their humane approach during the disaster also. Just after that came their call: "We are expecting a gesture from Turkey." What is this gesture? Accepting to a certain degree their claims on the Aegean. What is this gesture? To accept their claims on Cyprus and making concessions therein. The third component of this gesture is not to prevent -even easing- the entrance of Cyprus into the EU despite this being against the London and Zurich agreements. ... Not only this; it was said in 6 September that "the issue of allowing for Turkey's candidacy in Helsinki depends on the position Turkey takes and the policy it sets forth throughout this time regarding the Aegean and Cyprus."*"<sup>96</sup> Holding a similar view, Oktay Vural from the MHP argues that the change in Greece's approach can be seen as "*a mask to gain back its lost prestige on the international platform.*"<sup>97</sup>

The heavy traffic preceding the acceptance of Turkey as the EU's candidate state in the EU State and Government Heads Summit organized in Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999, turned into a crises due to the problems between Turkey and Greece. Greece insistently demanded that a schedule on the Aegean and the Cyprus issues should be given to Turkey, and sanctions should be applied regarding these subjects in case Turkey does not create solutions (expectedly) in line with Greece's policies. Although Turkey was not totally satisfied, the crisis was

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<sup>95</sup> TGNA Protocol: 12 October 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 5. Birleşim)

<sup>96</sup> TGNA Protocol: 12 October 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 5. Birleşim)

<sup>97</sup> TGNA Protocol: 12 October 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı 5. Birleşim)

overcome also with the US President B. Clinton's special efforts and Turkey was declared as "candidate country" therefore. It was clearly understood in Helsinki that the factor that had turned the Turkey-EU relations into a problem and even into a crisis was the problems Turkey had with Greece. Turkey had problems with the Copenhagen Criteria too, yet Greece, using the advantage of being an EU member, was creating *de facto* situations that do not exist in those criteria, thus shaping EU decisions on the basis of its own political choices. Greece tries to solve the problems in line with its own interests as it is able to put pressure on Turkey through the EU, which has become the most important means for Greece's national policy. Since the political dialogue between Turkey and the EU came to a halt following the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, Greece was so much troubled as its ability to pressure Turkey was constrained. In fact, Greece's positive attitude on the way leading to Helsinki can partly be explained by this. That Turkey remains on the EU ground which Greece can control and influence is vitally important for Greece. In the 12th article of the Summit decrees taken after long negotiations in Helsinki, it says: "*Turkey is a candidate state on its way to join the Union based on the same criteria applied to other candidate countries,*" in the same paragraph, however, Turkey is also expected to conform, beside the Copenhagen Political Criteria, to the principals in the 4th and 9th articles.<sup>98</sup>

*12. The European Council welcomes recent positive developments in Turkey as noted in the Commission's progress report, as well as its intention to continue its reforms towards complying with the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a).*

*4. ... In this respect, the European Council stresses the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter and urges candidate States to make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they*

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<sup>98</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-1999. I.3.12.

*should, within a reasonable time, bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice. The European Council will review the situation relating to any outstanding disputes, in particular concerning the repercussions on the accession process and in order to promote their settlement through the International Court of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004. Moreover, the European Council recalls that compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations and that compliance with all the Copenhagen criteria is the basis for accession to the Union.*<sup>99</sup>

9. (a) *The European Council welcomes the launch of the talks aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on 3 December in New York and expresses its strong support for the UN Secretary-General's efforts to bring the process to a successful conclusion.*<sup>100</sup>

(b) *The European Council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all relevant factors.*<sup>101</sup>

Despite the excitement and cheer they created in Turkey, Helsinki Decrees were subject to intense discussions in the TGNA as to the clauses it has regarding the issues of Greece and Cyprus. Because, the "political cost" of Turkey's being declared as "candidate" in Helsinki was to resolve the cases of boundary with Greece, if not, to reach a solution until the end of 2004 by resorting to the Court of Justice. As far as Cyprus is concerned, active support to the UN's efforts was being expected from Turkey; in case it did not lead anywhere, that is to say, if a solution on the island could not be reached, it is stated, it would not be a precondition for the membership of Cyprus-GA. The only point that put Turkey at ease is the following sentence: "*the Council will take account of all the relevant factors.*" To dispel Turkey's doubts whether the points in the decree will be regarded as a "criteria," the President of Finland, also then the President of the EU Council, Lipponen wrote a letter as to

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<sup>99</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-1999. I.3.4

<sup>100</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-1999. I.3.9a

<sup>101</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-1999. I.3.9b

how to understand the decrees and sent it to the Prime Minister Ecevit. In his letter, Liponnen stresses that there is no other criteria in addition to the Copenhagen Criteria; *"The references to 4. and 9. paragraphs have nothing to do with membership criteria, they imply political dialogue."*<sup>102</sup> In fact, the commentaries in the newspapers published in Greece in 2 December 1999 summarize the situation: The title of the news in Katimerini reads "Greece has got what it wants; and Turkey, its ticket to Europe." Under it says: "As far as it is understood from the decree text, Greece has made most of its conditions get accepted but more important than this is, along with Turkey's orientation towards Europe, the creation of an atmosphere within the frameworks of UN and EU for both countries to live together." We read then in Elefterotipiya that *"as Turkey has become a candidate to the EU, Turkish-Greek problems has turned to be the Turkish-EU problem."*

On the other hand, what the Government side and the parties in power read into the Helsinki decrees is that "candidacy to the EU has won without having made any concessions" on the Greece and Cyprus issues. *"The right to be a candidate for membership has been given to Turkey without any preconditions"* says, for instance the Prime Minister Ecevit. *"In the decree text, there was an expression that could be interpreted as a direction making it necessary to take the Aegean problems we have with Greece to the Court of Justice in 2004 at the latest. We made clear that we can not accept it"*.<sup>103</sup> Ecevit explains what kind of a role the phenomenon of Europe would play in solving the problems between Turkey and Greece: *"As we have a stronger position in Europe, the Aegean problems, I believe, will be solved between Greece and us without any need to resort to the Court."*<sup>104</sup> Highlighting the role of the EU, the Deputy Prime Minister M. Yılmaz argues that *"in the context of both Cyprus and the existing problems with Greece, Turkey will support, and if necessary get involved in, the efforts for a peaceful and just resolution based on facts."*<sup>105</sup>

In his speech about the Cyprus-EU connection, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I. Cem says that *"We have not, and will not, tied ourselves to EU's policies, and we have made it clear; yet the expression in the paragraph in question is an expression that emboldens the Cyprus Greek side, an expression that orients the Cyprus Greek side towards conflict; so it goes against Turkey's interests."* He, then, underlines an important

<sup>102</sup> Mehmet Ali Birand [2001] Türkiye'nin Avrupa Macerası: 1959-1999, Doğan Kitap, İstanbul, p.535-536.

<sup>103</sup> TGNA Protocol: 14 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı, 33. Birleşim)

<sup>104</sup> TGNA Protocol: 14 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı, 33. Birleşim)

<sup>105</sup> TGNA Protocol: 14 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı, 33. Birleşim)

point: "We do not have to undersign the decisions taken by the EU. We have not negotiated this; they sit on their own and take this decision; we are not to undersign this document, it is not subject to discussion." In fact, it is possible to deduct from this the suggestion that Turkey's involvement in the membership process will contribute to the resolution of problems in the framework of Europeanness.

The Helsinki Decrees made the EU issue be discussed in the TGNA with a frequency that had never seen before; and as far as these discussions about the decrees are concerned, the relations with Greece and Cyprus were evaluated in relation to the EU perspective. Actually, it can be argued that, with Helsinki, the issues between Turkey and Greece have got "Europeanized" unequivocally. Its reflection on the TGNA meetings was obvious. Although the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece-EU connection was being rejected in the official discourse, this connection was being manifested in almost every speech. Claimed in the criticisms coming from the opposition is that Turkey has made concessions on the Cyprus issue without getting any guarantees; that it has paved the way for Cyprus-GA's membership; that now the EU has got involved for the resolution of bilateral problems with Greece in the way Greece wants; that those decrees have turned to be like criteria although they are not called "criteria." Cevat Ayhan from the SP, for example, remarks that Turkey, on the Aegean and Cyprus issues, have been tied up by the involvement of the EU.<sup>106</sup> In this context, the following words by Oktay Vural from the MHP is highly significant: "We appreciate that Greece is not intruding on the EU negotiations. The necessity to solve our problems needs no mentioning. EU's call to Greece for dialogue could help coming to a resolution."<sup>107</sup> Turkey has given up the approach that "the EU shall remain out of this business, dialogue and negotiation shall be done with Greece; as it is between the two countries," argues the old Prime Minister and the DYP Leader, T. Çiller, hinting that the EU was becoming the new platform for the problems. "If you prioritize the candidacy and membership of Southern Cyprus over Turkey," continues she, "you will not be able to prevent the same Southern Cyprus from vetoing you. What will we do then?! So, we must create solutions."<sup>108</sup> Noting that there are "traps" in front of Turkey, Oğuzhan Asiltürk from the FP explains the difficulty in Turkey to make sense of the fact that Greece was pleased at the decrees at the same time with Turkey.<sup>109</sup> Recai Kutan, again from the FP group, draws our attention to the Greece's advantage deriving from its

<sup>106</sup> TGNA Protocol: 10 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı, 32. Birleşim)

<sup>107</sup> TGNA Protocol: 22 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı, 46. Birleşim)

<sup>108</sup> TGNA Protocol: 19 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı, 37. Birleşim)

<sup>109</sup> TGNA Protocol: 14 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem,2.Yasama Yılı, 33. Birleşim)

full membership by saying that *"in this summit, Greece and Greek side was backed up by the EU on the issues of both Cyprus and the conflicts in the Aegean. Greece-Cyprus-GA's argument has become EU's argument."*<sup>110</sup> Speaking on behalf of the DYP, Necati Çetinkaya states that the EU has put forth clear demands on the issues of Greece islands and Aegean, Cyprus as well as A. Öcalan.<sup>111</sup>

The Accession Partnership Document prepared by the EU Council following the decision taken in Helsinki shattered the positive atmosphere in Turkey regarding the EU and the relations with Greece in particular. Having given since the mid 1999 the impression that it had changed its relations with Turkey towards "collaboration-friendship and support with regard to the EU issue," Greece proved in the APD that it kept its old approach about the issues of the conflicts in the Aegean and Cyprus. Pointing out this situation during the TGNA meetings held in 5 December 2000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem assures that they will not take a step outside of the decisions taken in Helsinki about the Aegean and Cyprus issues, that they see the issue as part of the "political dialogue and political measures" but absolutely not as "criteria." Greece's approach in the APD shows that its intention was to use these issues as a criterion rather than to consider them "within the framework of political dialogue." Giving the utmost importance to the relations with Greece and having established a close relationship with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece, Papandreaeu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cem confirms the change in Greece's attitude. He says: "In the Helsinki Final Conclusion Declaration, these were not put in front of Turkey as a condition, a requirement...the then the EU President even wrote our Prime Minister a letter explaining that the Cyprus paragraph as well as the paragraph that we call "Aegean" are definitely not a precondition but a part of political dialogue only. That is to say, he gave his guarantee... Then we declared that we had accepted the Helsinki Final Conclusion... Now, what had happened in the meantime; we had faced an effort to change this, to turn these two issues into a criterion; we have solved this problem too. ...Both subjects are under the sub-title "political dialogue and political measures" and both subjects I have just mentioned -which is the critical sentence- bears the expression "in the framework of political dialogue"<sup>112</sup>

Almost all of the MPs who spoke in the TGNA agreed that it had been a "mistake" not to have declared Greece as a "terrorist country" because

<sup>110</sup> TGNA Protocol: 19 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı,37. Birleşim)

<sup>111</sup> TGNA Protocol: 19 December 1999 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem, 2.Yasama Yılı,, 37. Birleşim)

<sup>112</sup> TGNA Protocol: 05 December 2000 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem, 3.Yasama Yılı, 24. Birleşim)

of the Öcalan scandal, or not to have resorted to European Court of Human Rights for compensation, and to have trusted Greece after all. For example, Bülent Akarcalı speaking on behalf of the ANAP says: " If we could ever have sued Greece in the European Court of Human Rights for - apart from our martyrs- our people who were killed, whose fields were burnt off, whose cattle were wasted; for the schools, the construction equipments, the hospitals, all burnt down; if we could ever have sued in the European Court of Justice Greece for its having been caught red-handed supporting terror, supporting the terrorist leader with its state, its Prime Minister, its Minister, its Minister of Defense as well as its ambassador; could it be that easier for Greece to put the Cyprus problem in the Accession Partnership Document? ... Apparently, Greece will not be making a radical change in its policies concerning Turkey; until, of course, we have the means that we can use against Greece. What was this means? It was Greece, after Syria, was the country whose support for terrorism was officially and unreservedly confirmed."<sup>113</sup>

Pointing out the problem with Greece in his speech, Suat Cağlayan from the DSP in the Government calls Europe on duty to turn Europeanization into a means for the elimination of problems. "...*The best way to bring peace to the Aegean is the discussion by the two countries of the problems as a whole. In this approach, there are responsibilities on the side of the EU as well. If the EU wants the Aegean problem to be resolved justly, all it has to do is to push Greece into dialogue with Turkey*" says Cağlayan. According to him, traces of this can be found in the accession partnership document.<sup>114</sup>

In the speeches made during the negotiations in the TGNA regarding the budget of Ministry of Foreign Affair Turkey-Greece-EU relations came up in the same conceptual framework. Criticizing in their speeches the Government and the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as the EU, the representatives of the parties in opposition mention rather frequently how "partial" the EU is to Greece and how Greece, who had worn a "mask of friendship" following the Öcalan scandal, has embraced an "attitude of hostility" again. Here, the most intense criticism against the Government is that Greece was not cornered following the Öcalan scandal. Hüseyin Kansu from the SP in opposition accuses the EU of pursuing a partial policy between Turkey and Greece, and adds: "*You will put as a precondition for Turkey's membership to the EU the resolution of Cyprus problem as well as the conflicts with Greece regarding the Aegean; but, on the one hand, Greece will be in the Union, on the other*

<sup>113</sup> TGNA Protocol: 05 December 2000 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi:21.Dönem, 3.Yasama Yılı, 24. Birleşim)

<sup>114</sup> TGNA Protocol: 05 December 2000 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 3.Yasama Yılı, 24. Birleşim)

*hand, despite all these, you will have the intention and determination to let the Southern Cyprus into the Union... Given this bare fact, if you say "yes" to one side and tell the other "solve your problems first, then you may come in," this suggests your partiality to Southern Cyprus and Greece; needless to say that your sincerity will become doubtful"*<sup>115</sup> Turhan Güven from the DYP warns the Government to be more careful in its "friendship efforts:" *"It is good to make efforts for friendly relations with Greece, who is hostile to our country, who even supports terror; as far as the EU is concerned, however, those come to appear on our way and tie us up."*<sup>116</sup>

Despite the "disappointments" about Greece, which resonated also in the TGNA; particularly through the close relationship between the Minister of Foreign Affairs Cem and Papandreu, the multi-dimensional relations between Turkey and Greece got concentrated and diversified with respect to pre-1999. Accepted in 26 April 2001, the collaboration deal, which is by and large about issues like terror, drugs, organized crimes, illegal immigration, was made a law by the TGNA. So was the agreement on "mutual inducement of investments" on the same day.<sup>117</sup>

One of the important developments of this period was the breaking up of the FP into two groups. Recai Kutan and his friends representing the party's traditional line founded the Felicity Party, whereas the ones representing the young and "modern" side of the party founded in 14 August 2001 the Justice and Development Party under the leadership of R.T. Erdoğan and A. Gul. Taking the floor on behalf of the AK Parti in the TGNA meeting in 9 December 2001, M. Necati Çetinkaya asserts that Cyprus issue has almost been identified with the EU and emphasizes that a serious mistake was made in Helsinki. According to Çetinkaya, Greece has left the issue to the EU through a policy -very successful from its viewpoint- and has retreated.<sup>118</sup> In the same meeting, another MP from the AK Parti, Azmi Ateş asks the Government the question *"How is Turkey to take for granted that the ESDP will not be intervening with our problematic zones with Greece?"* and points out the problems stemming from Greece's use of the EU as a means.<sup>119</sup>

In her speech in the TGNA in 12 December 2001, former Prime Minister and DYP President T. Çiller, pointing out the emerging problems about Cyprus, and particularly Cyprus's becoming an EU member, asks the

<sup>115</sup> TGNA Protocol: 18 December 2000 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 21. Birleşim)

<sup>116</sup> TGNA Protocol: 26 April 2001 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 92. Birleşim)

<sup>117</sup> TGNA Protocol: 26 April 2001 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 92. Birleşim)

<sup>118</sup> TGNA Protocol: 9 December 2001 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 35. Birleşim)

<sup>119</sup> TGNA Protocol: 9 December 2001 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 35. Birleşim)

Government if it is going to take this risk. *"We pay the price" you claim; are you going to abandon the EU? No; Turkey does abandon neither Cyprus nor the EU.*" The EU (one can call it Europeanization), according to Çiller, is the most important factor in determining Turkey's policies about Greece and Cyprus.<sup>120</sup> Mustafa Geçer, speaking on behalf of the SP, claims that the EU has recognized the Cyprus-GA as the only representative of Cyprus and Turkey overlooked this in Helsinki; from then on, in case of a friction or a crisis with Cyprus, Turkey has taken the risk of finding itself not only against Greece but the whole Europe.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> TGNA Protocol: 12 December 2001 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 4.Yasama Yılı, 38. Birleşim)

<sup>121</sup> TGNA Protocol: 25 December 2001 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21.Dönem, 4.Yasama Yılı, 41. Birleşim)

#### **4. TGNA 22<sup>nd</sup> Term (22-1, 22-2, 22-3,22-4.Legislative Years): November 2002-July 2004**

##### **a. General Political Situation: 2002-2006**

In the elections held in 3 November 2002, a real political earthquake happened; only the AK Parti and the CHP could get in the TGNA while the ANAP, the DYP, the DSP, the MHP fell under the 10% election threshold. Since R.T. Erdoğan was not an MP then due to the political ban forbidding his participation in the elections, it was the Prime Ministry of A. Gül under the presidency of which the 58. Government was established in 18 November 2002. Just after the elections, R. T. Erdoğan pursued a highly active policy for a negotiation date in the EU Council Copenhagen Summit in 12-13 December 2002 to begin the membership negotiations with the EU; therefore pleased both Turkey and the EU, who had been wondering about the way the AK Parti was going to take. It could easily be argued that the main concern behind the AK Parti's clinging to the EU policy with that much of a determination and insistence is the issue of legitimacy within the domestic politics.

After four months of Government under the Prime Ministry of A. Gül, R. T. Erdoğan entered the parliament thanks to the repetition of the repudiated elections in Siirt; and following A. Gül's resignation, R. T. Erdoğan became the Prime Minister in 14 March 2003. After the elections in 3 November 2002, the AK Parti hastened with an increasing willingness and effort the endeavors to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria; endeavors that had started with the previous parliament. The main reason for Turkey's insistence in the December 2002 Summit was the fact that Cyprus-GA was going to be an EU member by 1 May 2004. This situation made it necessary for Turkey to carry out a bidirectional strategy.

In the European Council Copenhagen Summit held in 12-13 December 2002, it was agreed that the ten candidate states including the Cyprus-GA was going to be members by 1 May 2004. In the "Turkey" section of the Conclusion Report of the Summit, in the light of the Council's 2004 Progress Report and the Commission's opinion, it is said that in case it is agreed in the December 2004 Summit that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the negotiations will start without any delay.

The "harmonization" with the Copenhagen Political Criteria packages were carried on in the year of 2003 too. The TGNA arranged and accepted 4. 5., (11 and 23 January 2003) and 6. (19 July 2003) "harmonization laws" in this period. In the meantime, entrusted with the task of monitoring and negotiating the developments regarding the process of joining the EU, the "European Union Harmonization Commission" was established in 19 April 2003. This Commission was to check whether the bills and legislative proposals presented to the TGNA as well as the decree laws are in line with the EU legislation, and to deliver opinion accordingly. On the Cyprus issue, which is the most important subject matter of Turkey's relations with the EU and Greece, the negotiations about the plan that the UN General Secretary Annan put forth continued throughout the year of 2004. Despite the efforts for a resolution, however, the process of the Cyprus-GA's way leading to the EU continued without any interruption and the Cyprus-GA confirmed with the EU the Accession Agreement in 14 June 2003.

2004 was the year of highly critical developments on Turkey's way to the EU, particularly in the context of Cyprus. The AK Parti Government, for the first time, took a different political position on Cyprus issue than of Rauf Denktaş. Realizing the importance for the future of Turkey with the EU of reaching a solution within the framework of Annan Plan, the Government intensified its campaign of pressure on the TRNC. Although there was almost no obstacle for the Cyprus-GA's becoming a EU member by 1 May 2004 under the name "Republic of Cyprus," Turkey was trying to realize the significance of the problems it was going to face with the new EU following 1 May, that is to say, it was trying to determine a new policy within the framework of "real-politics." This situation resonated in the TGNA too; the AK Parti Group, which declared many times -and finally in 6 March 2003- its full agreement with the TRNC and its legendary leader, Rauf Denktaş, supported the Government's "resolution" policy. The opposition, on the other hand, made remarks manifesting its perception of the situation as nearly a "betrayal." As far as the Cyprus issue is concerned, such a disagreement in the TGNA had never happened before.

That Cyprus-GA was going to become an EU member regardless of a resolution was confirmed by the remarks coming out of the EU in this period; clarified also in those remarks was that in case of an acceptance of Annan Plan by both sides, the EU would make a new arrangement taking this development into account. The EU Council gathered in Brussels in 25-26 March 2004 underlined its support for finding a permanent resolution to the Cyprus problem in the light of the UN Security Council's solutions. In the referendum held simultaneously on both sides of the

island in 24 April 2004 the %64.9 of Turkish people accepted the Annan Plan, whereas the %75.83 of the Cyprus-GA rejected it. The possibility of the entrance to the EU of a "United Cyprus" was gone thereby. Despite this, however, the EU confirmed the "Cyprus Statute" in 29 April and thus showed that Turkey's good intention and its efforts towards resolution were not to be ignored, Turkey's positive approach on this subject was going to be taken into consideration. The 5<sup>th</sup> expansion of the EU with 10 new members came true in 1 May 2004.

In fact, the AK Parti Government's Cyprus Policy bore highly political risks. Undertaking this risk, the government carried on with the reforms while trying to ensure that the negotiations start following the Summit to take place at the end of 2004. In the meantime, a highly significant decision implying that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen Political Criteria was declared by the European Council Assembly of Parliaments in 22 June and the Council terminated the process of monitoring Turkey thereby. Both the European Council 2004 Turkey Progress Report declared in 6 October 2004 and the related recommendation document stated that Turkey had fulfilled the political criteria and advised that the negotiations for joining the EU should begin. In the EU Council of State and Government Heads Summit Meeting held in Brussels in 16-17 December, it was decided that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria enough to begin the negotiations and anticipated that the negotiations were to start in 3 October 2005.<sup>122</sup> In the Summit decisions, however, there were also verdicts - that were going to create problems and cause the negotiations to be frozen under 8 headings-regarding what Turkey had to do with respect to its relations with Cyprus and Greece:

*"19. The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States. In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that "the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalizing the adaptations which are necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union."*

*20. The European Council, while underlining the need for unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations welcomed the improvement in Turkey's relations with its*

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<sup>122</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-2004.

*neighbors and its readiness to continue to work with the concerned Member States towards resolution of outstanding border disputes in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter. .”*

2005 passed by with the problems arose between Turkey and Cyprus-GA in the context of Ankara Protocol. Met in Luxembourg in 13 June 2005, the EU Ministers of Foreign Affairs signed the Protocol that expands the Ankara Agreement to cover the 10 new states. In the conclusion report the EU Government and State Heads Summit released in 16-17 June, there was no direct statement about Turkey; yet, with reference to the previous Summit decisions, the necessity to fully implement the decisions was emphasized. In 29 June 2005, on the other hand, the European Commission announced “The Outline of Accession Negotiations Framework for Turkey,” one of the Turkey-oriented documents expected to be prepared sometime in the year 2005. In the outline there a list concerning the general principles framing the negotiations, the content of the negotiations, the negotiation procedures, and the negotiation headings.

In the meeting the EU Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Brussels in 18 July, the discussion on the outline was postponed to the unofficial Council of General Affairs and Foreign Relations in 1-2 September, due to the fact that Turkey had not yet signed the protocol expanding the Additional Protocol to include 10 new members. In 1 May 2004, Turkey signed the “Supplementary Protocol” expanding the Ankara Protocol, which also constituted in 30 July 2005 the juridical basis of Turkey’s relations with the EU, to include the 10 states that became EU member in 1 May 2004. Following this signing, Turkey published a declaration clarifying that signing the Supplementary Protocol did not mean that Turkey recognized the Cyprus-GA named as “The Republic of Cyprus” in the Protocol. This declaration was met with Cyprus-GA’s reaction and the Cyprus-GA strived to make the EU publish a joint declaration against Turkey. These endeavors resulted in a counter declaration published in 21 September 2005 on the issue of Cyprus. Emphasized in this declaration was that the EU recognized only one legal government in Cyprus, also that Turkey had to recognize Cyprus not before it becomes a member but during the negotiation process, also that it had to open its airports and harbors to the Greek side. Gathered in Luxembourg in 3 October 2005, the EU Council of General Affairs and Foreign Relations, authorized by the Conclusion Report of the EU State and Government Heads Meeting in December 2004, confirmed with Turkey the membership negotiations framework document. Thus, negotiations

were officially started. Following the beginning of negotiations, however, criticisms and discussions remained as to whether Turkey has fulfilled its obligations -stemming from the Ankara Agreement and the Customs Union- for the Cyprus-GA. Gathered in the EU Council of General Affairs, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member states accepted the Commission Advice dating 29 November and suggesting the suspension of negotiations for 8 headings. In this framework, it was decided that the 8 headings, which cover the political areas concerning Turkey's restrictions against the Cyprus-GA, was not going to be opened or be temporarily closed until the Commission confirmed that Turkey kept its promises with respect to the Supplementary Protocol.

**b. Protocols: November 2002- December 2006: TGNA 22. Term 1, 2, 3, 4. Legislative Years**

For this section covering the four legislative years (22-1, 22-2, 22-3 ve 22-4) during the 22. term of the TGNA, in the examination of the TGNA protocols, approximately 5500 pages of protocol from 55 Sessions where the issues of EU, Greece, and Cyprus are discussed are analyzed.

3 November 2002 election is one of the most important elections in Turkish history. As a result of this election and due to the 10% election threshold, only the AK Parti, the CHP and 8 independent MPs won the right to be represented in the TGNA while the AK Parti, winning almost the two third of the seats, has found an ample space to act easily.<sup>123</sup> It seems, however, that both the AK Parti and the CHP have made their mark on the TGNA discussions. As far as the policies about the EU, Cyprus and Greece are concerned, the difference put forth by the AK Parti Governments, first under the Prime Ministry of A. Gul, then of R. T: Erdoğan has resonated in the TGNA. The idea of "Europeanness" and making policies revolving around this have unprecedentedly come to forward in the 22<sup>nd</sup> term of the TGNA. That being a one-party majority government provides easiness in important and risky fields of foreign politics and the general optimistic atmosphere with respect to the EU can be sensed from the discourses of the MPs.

As the Prime Minister of the first AK Parti Government that came into power in 18.11.2002 and served for 4,5 months, A. Gul, explains the viewpoint of his party on the issues of EU-Greece and Cyprus in the

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<sup>123</sup> Followings are the parties represented in the TGNA and the numbers of MPs they have by the February 2007: AK Parti:354 , CHP: 153, MP:21 , Independent: 9, DYP:4, YP:1, SHP: 1, PAP:1, Total: 544 (6 empty).

speech he made in the TGNA (17 December 2002) just after the EU Council Copenhagen Summit (12-13 December 2002). Following this summit also called "date for a date" for Turkey, where it is said that *"If it is confirmed in the 2004 Progress Report that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, membership negotiations will begin right away."*<sup>124</sup>; Gül's speech, being a reminiscent of the concept "Europeanization," expresses the idea that Turkey as an EU member will be able to solve its problems regarding Greece and Cyprus much more easily. The following excerpt by A. Gül shows his positive approach to the idea of *"resolving the problems regarding Greece and Cyprus under the roof of the EU"*

*"We highly desire for an ultimate peace in Cyprus; but we have to ensure that the events we fear will not emerge once again, Cyprus has to be a peace island. Once these are taken for granted, a peace there is for the benefit of all of us; this island has to be a peace island. I even said to all that there is a shortcut. Since we think of EU as a home; once we are at home all together, all those problems will be resolved automatically; for even boundaries will be meaningless. As the boundaries among 15 countries have lost their meaning today, the boundaries between Turkey and Cyprus, Cyprus and Greece, Greece and Turkey will not be that much important tomorrow. So, I said, we shall go in that home all together, we shall hasten this process and in this way problems shall be resolved thereby."*<sup>125</sup>

After he argues with insistence that the ultimate decision on the Cyprus issue was taken in 1999, the Prime Minister Gül declares his expectation from the EU its support for resolving the problem (*"EU should help resolving the Cyprus problem, it should not be in an attitude making a resolution there even more difficult"*). He also argues, on the other hand, that the issue should not be brought to the EU, but rather be solved under the UN roof: *"The negotiations in Cyprus are going on under the supervision of the United Nations. It is also the argument of Turkish state; not to carry this to the EU, to resolve this issue under the supervision of the United Nations."*<sup>126</sup> Another view that Gül underlines in his speech concerns the sensitivity the Cyprus issue creates in the society. His following statement signals a very important political change: *"I would like to draw your attention to one point: Let us think the Cyprus issue in the long run, let us consider the interests of Turkey, of the*

<sup>124</sup> Bulletin EU: 12-2002.

<sup>125</sup> TGNA Protocol: 17 .12.2002 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 11. Birleşim)

<sup>126</sup> TGNA Protocol: 17 .12.2002 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 11. Birleşim)

*TRNC; let us keep these away from polemics, from internal political issues" Gul's approach makes it possible for Europe to intervene with the process and to be a part of the equation; that is to say, it paves the way for "Europeanization" to become a platform for the resolution of problems.*

Speaking in the same session, the leader of the main party in opposition, Deniz Baykal, on the other hand, emphasizes that Turkey's starting the negotiations in 2005 instead of 2003 -upon the decision taken in Copenhagen- will bring about utterly important problems; and Turkey will come under pressure on the issues of Aegean and Cyprus by both the EU and Greece as well as the Cyprus-GA, which is to be a full member of the EU in 2004. Baykal says: *"When we sit on the negotiation table in 2005, they will ask if we have resolved our problems with Greece in the Aegean; for, in Helsinki, it was demanded that whatever is necessary for the resolution of the Aegean problem as well as the boundary cases between Turkey and Greece must be done; if a resolution does not come about, the case must be sent to the Court of Justice. Moreover, "Let us not forget Helsinki, Helsinki is on the table too" said Papandreu after the Copenhagen meeting. That is to say, he meant that if we are to turn up in 2005, we shall resolve the Aegean problem before we show up. The postponement of membership negotiations for Turkey means that the responsibility to resolve with Greece the Aegean problems is consigned to us."* He brings out realistically that the problems have got beyond the bilateral talks and the boundaries of the UN platform.<sup>127</sup>

In the session dating 23.01.2003, the Bill Concerning the Approval of the Confirmation of the Collaboration Agreement between the Government of Turkish Republic and the Government of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the Field of Air Search and Rescue was discussed.<sup>128</sup> Following Britain's statement that it was going to transfer the responsibility in question of search and rescue to the Cyprus Greek Administration by 1 March 2002, both the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the Republic of Turkey immediately issued a notam objecting to Britain's unilateral transfer of responsibility of search and rescue to the Cyprus Greek Administration. Elekdağ emphasized that Greece with the support of the EU was making insistent attempts to increase its territorial waters in the Aegean to 12 miles. Speaking on behalf of the CHP in the session in 30 January 2003, Onur Oymen expressed the difficulties Turkey faced -

<sup>127</sup> TCNA Protocol: 17 .12.2002 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 11. Birleşim)

<sup>128</sup> TCNA Protocol: 23.01.2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 26. Birleşim)

thanks to the vetoes by Greece- in receiving financial aid from the EU and the responsibility on the side of the EU to take initiative on this issue.<sup>129</sup>

On the Cyprus issue, which has become the most important key subject of the Turkey-EU relations in the last couple of years, crucial developments took place throughout the year 2003. It was different, this time, though. There arose disagreements between the Turkish Government supporting the Annan Plan for a resolution on the island and the TRNC President Rauf Denktaş. The resulting fridity with Denktas, who is a "national hero" in Turkey, had inevitable effects on the internal politics. Invited, partly because of this, to the TGNA session in 6 March 2003, Denktaş made a speech pointing out the handicaps of the Annan Plan and the strategies of Greece and the Cyprus-GA. After this speech, a decree was issued with the consensus of all the parties represented in the TGNA. Beginning with "Please be informed that we hereby present our recommendations, which were collectively prepared by all the political parties represented in the TGNA, to be announced, as the decision of the General Assembly of the TGNA, to our Honorable Parliament as well as to the world public," the 6th article of the decree states that it *"rejects all the attempts towards putting forward the resolution of Cyprus problem as a pre-condition in the process of Turkey's membership to the EU;"* the 7th article *"emphasizes once again that all the steps taken to make the Southern Cyprus Greek Administration an EU member before Turkey are a clear violation of the international agreements."*<sup>130</sup> What is rather clear here in these is an attempt to ease public's conscience with respect to the politics.

With A.Gül's leaving its seat to the AK Parti leader R. T. Erdoğan, who entered the parliament following the first-repudiated-then-repeated elections in Siirt, the 59th Turkish Republic Government was established under the Prime Ministry of R. T. Erdogan. During 4 months of Gül's Prime Ministry, Erdoğan in the capacity of his AK Parti leadership gained great reputation both in Turkey and in the outside world; he presented himself as *"to be the Prime Minister soon, not now though for technical reasons."* R. T. Erdoğan established the 2. AK Parti Government in 14 March 2003 and the Government Programme was read in the session held in 18.03.2003. Stated in the Programme is that the relations with Greece will be carried on by intensifying the relations based on mutual economic interests; and through the atmosphere of trust to be created by those relations, some groundwork will be laid for the resolution of rather

<sup>129</sup> TGNA Protocol: 30 January 2002 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı 29. Birleşim)

<sup>130</sup> TGNA Protocol: 6 March 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı 42. Birleşim)

complicated political problems. This Government Programme, in comparison with the previous ones, appears to give more room for flexibility with respect to the issue of the effect of Europe or of EU membership on the relations with Greece.<sup>131</sup>

The session held in 26.03.2003 provides us with useful hints regarding the Government's EU policy, and its approach to the Cyprus problem in this context as well as the general attitude in the TGNA on this matter. Touching upon the latest developments in the relations with the EU, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gul, talks about the handicaps that would emerge lest there is no progress regarding the Cyprus issue. *"I should emphasize that the resolution of the Cyprus problem is not among the political criteria about the accession of our country to the EU. Thus, the only political criteria that bind us are the Copenhagen political criteria. Cyprus issue is not one of these criteria; but if you take into consideration the full EU membership of the Cyprus-GA and Greece, and if you look at the general atmosphere in all European countries, although there is no such a direct relation, it should be taken into account as a factor and should be followed carefully; for we can not keep our eyes closed to this matter "* says Gül explaining the policy change necessitated by the *de facto* situation. In his same speech, Gül also makes the following statement that lays bare the connection among Europeanization, Greece and the Cyprus politics: *"All these have indicated that there is need for mutual trust. A lot will be done not only on the table but also on the ground. We believe that all these attempts will be well-considered by the EU, the Cyprus-GA, and Greece; in fact, as a result of those attempts, endeavors to lift the embargo imposed on Cyprus by the EU have been just initiated."* While Gül sticks to certain parameters on the issue of Cyprus, he argues that the resolution of the problem will put Turkey at ease in the EU process, and that we can not ignore that. Thus, this statement also manifests the fact that the AK Parti Government does act on the basis of the idea that "deadlock is not a resolution."<sup>132</sup> In the talks in the TGNA, the MPs from the AK Parti made comments supporting the Government's expansion on the issue in question. Acknowledging these positive developments, İnal Batu from the CHP, the main opposition party, warns that unless Turkey can put this process to good, and find solution to the problems between Turkey and Greece by 2004, taking the case to the International Court of Justice might be imposed to us. By saying *"what is also positive is that the*

<sup>131</sup> TGNA Protocol: 18 March 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı 49. Birleşim); [http://www.dilevi.org/secimsonucu/50\\_hukümet.htm](http://www.dilevi.org/secimsonucu/50_hukümet.htm) (Access: 03.02.2007), Şaban Çalış [2006] Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, 3. Basım, Nobel Publication, Ankara, P.:490-542.

<sup>132</sup> TGNA Protocol :23 March 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 84. Birleşim)

*Cyprus problem has reached to a point that gives hope in terms of the relations with the EU,"* Batu also hints at the fact that the opposition too accepts the *de facto* connection between the EU and the problems between Turkey and Greece. Batu even says: *"There is no doubt that the current panorama in Cyprus has been -and will be- effective in Turkey's progress towards a more constructive point in its relations with the EU."* Batu's following assertions strike out as it signals the apprehension of EU's importance as an instrument in relations: *"We hope that the necessary steps for initiating a sympathetic and constructive dialogue with Greece are being taken. Otherwise, 2004 arrives quickly and this time we might be faced with a delaying tactic like "now go and solve the Aegean problems, then we shall give you a date." If we are not to let this happen, when the time is up, it is crucial that at least we are in a positive and constructive process of dialogue with Greece, even if we have not resolved the problems."* In this period, it can be clearly understood that the TGNA is not troubled by the connection established between Greece & Cyprus and the EU. Speaking in this session, Halil Akyüz from the CHP claims that Turkish-Greek rapprochement will strengthen the EU as well. Despite the improvement of the Turkish-Greek relations, argues Halil Akyüz, the problems of Western Thrace Turks have remained. Speaking in the same session on behalf of the AK Parti, Eyüp Fatsa argues that the full membership to the EU will introduce a new perspective to Turkey's relations with Greece. He emphasizes the EU's role in the relations by saying that *"Once the Turkey's full membership is realized, the Aegean will be an EU region unifying Turkey and Greece rather than a matter of conflict."*<sup>133</sup>

Explaining the AK Parti Government's approach to the Turkish-Greek and the EU relations in his speech in the TGNA session in 29.05.2003, the Prime Minister Erdoğan gives very important messages. He says: *"Any deterioration in the process of our full membership to the EU will also decrease the chance of resolving our problems with Greece. If Turkey's full membership is realized, the Aegean will be an EU region unifying Turkey and Greece rather than a matter of conflict; in such a situation overcoming the problems is much easier. The same condition is valid also in the context of the Cyprus-GA's membership to the EU. While almost 30 countries, which will become EU members in the foreseeable future, are able to protect their national identity on the one hand, and are able to overcome the conflicts and divisions among themselves through the culture of tolerance, unification and solidarity on the other, it should be unthinkable for us to push ourselves outside of this Grand Project."*<sup>134</sup>

<sup>133</sup> TGNA Protocol: 23 March 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 84. Birleşim)

<sup>134</sup> TGNA Protocol: 29 May 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 87. Birleşim)

The view that the EU can play a positive role in the relations between Turkey and Greece is also expressed by the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in the opening speech of 2. Legislative Year of the 22<sup>nd</sup> term of the TGNA. Sezer argues that the problems obstructing the progress in the relations between Turkey and Greece can be eliminated by the initiative of the countries sharing the same values and ideals within the EU.<sup>135</sup>

Having been discussed in the previous periods, the issue of minority foundations came up once again in 19.6.2003 in the context of Sixth Harmonization Package. At this point, the opposition's criticism that the Government ignores the reciprocity principle. Speaking in 19.6.2003 Haluk Koç reminds that "the patriarch in Istanbul is elected by the Greeks; but the Turks in the Western Thrace are not allowed to elect the mufti of the Turks." Along the same lines, Onur Öymen highlights the great inequalities between the Greek minorities in Turkey and the Turkish minorities in Greece with respect to the rights they have.<sup>136</sup>

Despite the criticisms of the opposition in this period, bilateral agreements were signed between Turkey and Greece; the Government's rationale behind those agreements was that they were going to lay some groundwork for the improvement of the relations with the EU. The Bill Affirming the Confirmation of the Protocol Regarding the Establishment of a Turkish-Greek Common Duty Force between the Turkish Republic and the Greek Republic as a Countermeasure to Natural Disasters was discussed in this period. A new bilateral agreement was added to the previous ones in 25 December 2003 and The Confirmation of the Agreement between the Turkish Republic and the Greek Republic that Prevents Double Taxation as to the Income Taxes was approved. Halil Akyuz, speaking on behalf of the CHP, sees this agreement as an historical step in terms of the rapprochement of the two countries as, argues he, it will improve the economic, commercial, social and cultural relations between the two countries. Pointing out again the improvement in the Turkish-Greek relations, Mustafa Dundar from the AK Parti brings up the issue of progressive contacts -an important factor in the rapprochement process carried on since 1999 towards finding ways of resolving the Aegean problems. Progressive contacts constitute the first step for official negotiations that can be initiated with the aim of resolving the Aegean problems by means of negotiations. As a result of such efforts, 19

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<sup>135</sup> TGNA Protocol: 1 October 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı, 1. Birleşim)

<sup>136</sup> TGNA Protocol: 19 June 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı, 96. Birleşim)

agreements and protocols have been contracted between Turkey and Greece in the last three and a half years. Another bilateral agreement discussed and confirmed in the TGNA is the Agreement between the Turkish Republic and the Greek Republic Concerning the Realization of the Turkey-Greece Gas Connection and the Natural Gas Supply From the Turkish Republic to the Greek Republic. Thus, the Turkey-Greece relations backed up by both the economic and the commercial agreements has been going through a better period. .

Despite the bilateral agreements between Turkey and Greece, the Cyprus-GA's EU membership has remained to be a negative factor for the relations with Greece. Speaking particularly about the Annan Plan in the session held in 17 February 2004, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gül, notes that Cyprus-GA's becoming an EU member will have inevitable negative consequences for Turkey and the Turkey-EU relations, particularly on the Cyprus issue. First and foremost, Gül anticipates that the Cyprus-GA will look for ways within the EU to resolve the issue of Cyprus in line with their own thesis and to melt the Cyprus Turkish People in the EU pot. *"We can not ignore that Cyprus has become an EU-related subject,"* says Gül. According to him, this situation in fact disturbs *"the EU Commission, the European Parliament, and the member states, too."*<sup>137</sup>

In the 22<sup>nd</sup> term of the TGNA, dimensions of Turkey-Greek relations other than Cyprus also came up from time to time. Those dimensions were brought up mostly by the opposition party, which -beside its general accusation against the Government of "making concessions to Greece for the sake of its love for EU"- has usually argued that the "correspondence" factor is being ignored. Şükrü Elekdâğ from the CHP, for example, points out the unresolved problems in the Aegean. He claims that Greece's arming the islands, the FIR line, territorial waters, the practices in airspace that it claimed to be under its disposal are all violations of Turkey's international rights. For Elekdâğ, despite the aforementioned relaxation of the Turkish-Greek relations, Greece has not given up these practices. In this context, the so-called progressive contacts are to lull Turkey and to give the international community the impression that a lot is done to overcome the conflict. Greece is considering to bring up the Aegean problems around the time a negotiation date is about to be given to Turkey, claims Elekdâğ in his speech, and impose to our country its demands by using the veto threat. In a similar manner, the problems of the Western Thrace Turks were brought up by Onur Öymen in 1 June

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<sup>137</sup> TGNA Protocol: 17 February 2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı 53. Birleşim)

2005, again on behalf of the opposition party.<sup>138</sup> Criticized in the discussions was the decision recently taken by the High Court in Greece to close an association because of the word "Turk" it has in its name. It was argued that Greece had violated both the Lausanne Agreement and the European Law and this was tolerated by the EU. What strikes out in this whole process is the Government's emphasis on the connection between the relations with Greece and the EU policies.

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<sup>138</sup> TGNA Protocol: 1 June 2005 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 3. Yasama Yılı, 106. Birleşim)

## **B- Examination of the Protocols in the Contexts of Subject Headings**

The content analysis of the relations between Turkey and Greece in the TGNA Protocols in the context of "Europeanization" reveals certain disputed fields. In summary, the following conclusions have been drawn:

### **1- EU**

EEC/EC/EU have been an important fields of dispute and competition for the relations between Turkey and Greece since 1959. The competition between Greece and Turkey also played an important role in Turkey's application to the EEC just two weeks after Greece application to the same foundation on 15 July 1959. But the EEC had a particular position in transformation of field of "competition" into field of "dispute" after Greece became a full member of the EEC in 1981. Greece, as a state possessing the right of veto in the EEC, succeeded in instrumentalizing Turkey-EEC relations for its own foreign policy. It could be confidently said that Greece was in an effort to pressurize Turkey through the EEC/EC/EU and to find solutions in favor of Greece through this platform.

The TGNA Protocols of the period between 1994 and 2006 analyzed clearly put that the issues with the EU and Greece were debated together. In Turkey-Greece relations, Europeanization, as an element to prevent the conflicts and maintain the peace, usually functioned in favor of Greece because Greece is an EU member whereas Turkey is a state which wants to be member of the EU. For this reason, Turkey persistently claims that the disputes with Greece (including Cyprus issue) and the issue of the EU are different issues and thus tries to prevent Greece from making the EU an instrument for Turkey.

The decision of Turkey to finish the political dialogue with the EU after the Luxemburg Summit Decrees in December 1997 gives a clue about how important the pressure and the influence exerted on Turkey through Europeanization despite flaws and problems. This decision of Turkey to stop the political dialogue with the EU on all the issues including the bilateral ones with Greece and Cyprus put especially Greece on the hook, besides the view that a Turkey without any objective about the EU would be a more dangerous. Turkey gained ground. This situation was perceived like this not only in the EU but also in the USA and the efforts to make adjustments to the Luxemburg Decrees, giving Turkey the status of

"candidacy", were initiated in order to construct a platform for Greece "to exert pressure". As known, after the Luxemburg Decrees, Turkey adopted a severe attitude. Greece had difficulties in modifying its policies on Turkey due to the reasons related to internal politics, although Greece was aware it had to reduce the tension with Turkey for cutting down on defense expenses in order to enter the EU Fiscal Union. But some events in 1999 strengthened Turkey and besides paved the way for development of more "appeaser" policies by Greece. Among those events, capturing process of the leader of the PKK, Kurdish separatist terror organization, Öcalan had a special importance. The capture of Öcalan on 16 February 1999 by having him removed from the Greece Embassy in Kenya made Greece vulnerable to Turkey's political attacks and caused to accusations of being "a terrorist state". Greece had to make a serious change in its policy on Turkey. The most reasonable move in this situation could be to quit blocking the relations of Turkey with the EU, moreover, to give support to Turkey. In other words, Greece could maintain the peace, through "Europeanization" and perpetuate it. But in order for Greek public to overcome the concern about Turkey, the Marmara Earthquake on 17 August would have to happen. The main objective of "Earthquake diplomacy" for Greece and the EU was to improve the relations of EU with Turkey. This instrumentation, without a doubt, was the preference of Turkey too. The process until Helsinki Summit held in December 1999, in which Turkey was given the status of "candidacy" was developed with the concept of "Europeanization". This was also a chance for Turkey to be able to display what it can accomplish in the domestic and in the foreign affairs when a clear perspective was received from the EU. Expectation and gratification were clearly observed in TGNA even though the positive change in the policy of Greece on Turkey was being viewed in a deliberate fashion.

The second period of concept of Europeanization occurred through the AK Parti which came to power in 2002. R.T.Erdoğan, the Prime Minister and the leader of the AK Parti, stated that the EU, issues of Cyprus and Aegean, the Europe Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) were all related and it would be more useful to inspect the issues as a package. The tendency of the TGNA also changed because of this approach of the ruling party. General view was that developments were positive even though the opposition parties accused the Government of "making concessions".

Undoubtedly, the bilateral disputes with Greece, association of Cyprus matter with the EU-Turkey relations were not Turkey's choice. Because Turkey did not have the same position with Greece which Turkey was in competition and moreover in conflict. But in the debates in TGNA, it is

expressed very often that in case Turkey receives an open perspective or becomes a member, almost all the matters, including that of Cyprus, will be resolved anyway. The problems here are the imbalance between the statuses of Greece and Turkey and lack of confidence of EU in Turkey's membership. An improvement in the relations of Turkey and Greece through Europeanization can be anticipated in case these problems are resolved.

## **2- Cyprus**

Cyprus matter has always appeared as an element which directly affects, almost always to the disadvantage of Turkey, the relations between Turkey and the EU. It appears that all the political parties, defend almost similar views, that they believe in dual state structure and that the parliament is very sensitive about this issue which is viewed as "national cause". In the conclusions of the TGNA in 1997, 1999 and in 2003, the view stating that Greece manipulated the EU in its conclusions about Cyprus matter and moreover; the EU was used as an instrument of blackmail against Turkey is expressed. In the context of Europeanization, the main problem in Cyprus matter, as it was the case in the issue of the EU, is political approach of the EU towards Turkey. In other words, Europeanization could produce a facilitator effect on Cyprus issue provided that Turkey's trust issues are resolved on the juridical and on the emotional basis. Otherwise, the parliament shares the view that the membership of Cyprus-GA to the EU is unlawful and membership of Cyprus-GA to the EU also means integration with Greece, "Megalo-Idea" in other words.

## **3- Bilateral Issues: Aegean, the Continental Shelf, Minorities, PKK**

There are several bilateral issues, with the inclusion of especially the ones related to Aegean, between Turkey and Greece. The bilateral issues, apart from those related to EU and Cyprus, constitute a very little fraction of the discussions of the TGNA concerning the relations with Greece. The issues in question are uttered in the context of Copenhagen Political Criteria, deputies prefer to view the demands of the EU, rather than as well-meant, as a part of the problems caused by Greece.

## Conclusion

For this study, in which the general approach that Europeanization has a stabilizing and conflict-settling impact on regional problems is discussed within the context of the relations between Turkey and Greece. To do this, the proceeding accounts of 189 sessions of TGNA in through 4 parliamentary election periods (19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd) between 1994-2006, are examined. The following main findings have come out of the analysis of approximately 20.600 pages of protocol belonging to the TGNA sessions where Turkey's relations with Greece and the EU are discussed:

- On the issues of Cyprus and the bilateral problems with Greece, the TGNA has been over-sensitive throughout all the periods and has seen almost every kind of compromise as "concession" and has rejected it thereby. The Greece and Cyprus issues have been regarded as a "national cause" almost in all periods and in this sense have been tabooed to certain degrees.
- Until 2002, both the political parties and the Governments had unequivocally claimed that there was no link between Turkey's problems regarding the issues of Greece and Cyprus and Turkey's goal of EU membership. The connection between these issues has become a subject matter of the negotiations for the first time with the AK Parti's leader Erdoğan's statements. The discourse in the TGNA has relatively changed since 2003.
- As far as the way the Parliamentary system works in Turkey is concerned, there is a discursive difference between the representatives of the parties in the government and the ones in the opposition. This situation comes under the light especially in the context of the relation with the EU. On the subject of EU, the main criticisms in the TGNA against the Governments have been the claims that the Government had made "concessions" on the issues of Greece and Cyprus, which it had not acted with enough "dignity." The parties in the Power, on the other hand, has insistently argued that there had never been, and was not going to be, any concessions; yet progress through struggle had been achieved on the EU issue.
- The general and constant opinion in the TGNA is that Greece has used, even "has taken in pledge" the EU for its own foreign political aims. Greece has become the main decisive factor in

Turkey's way to the EU and this has a negative impact on Turkey's relations with the West, particularly with the EU.

- As the expressions in the protocols indicate, it is highly possible that Europeanization becomes a means for the elimination of the problems between Turkey and Greece and for the prevention of any further conflicts. However, the unbalance between Turkey and Greece, stemming from one's being an EU member and the other's being a candidate, can further escalate the conflicts from time to time. Since it is impossible for Turkey to balance Greece's advantage, there seems to be only two ways of creating a positive atmosphere: 1. Turkey should be given an open perspective on the EU issue, 2. the EU should consider the bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece with a rather broader perspective and should increase its ability to put pressure on Greece too. Otherwise, Europeanization in itself can be a cause of conflict.
- In the TGNA, the main issues that comes up in relation to Greece are Cyprus, Turkey's EU membership, and other bilateral problems (sovereignty rights regarding the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea, continental shelf, airspace, armament of the islands in the East Aegean, minorities...). Strikingly enough, these problems are brought up in the context of Turkey's relations with the EU. This also displays how significant in fact Europeanization is as a factor for the resolution of the problems.
- As the problems between Turkey and Greece has begun to be expressed, significant periods with respect to the relations between Turkey and the EU has shown parallelism. Between 1994-2006, the two exceptions of this seem to be the periods of Kardak/Imia Crisis and of the capturing of the PKK leader Öcalan.
- It has been observed that Turkey tries to balance the disparity stemming from Greece's EU membership by instrumentalizing USA's need for Turkey due to its military-political strategic needs; in the TGNA the Government has been expected -at least until 2003- to put effort in this direction.
- The important phases the Turkey-EU relations have gone through since 1994 and the role Europeanization has had in the relations throughout those phases can be summarized as the following:
  - Demands of Central and East European Countries that queued up for the EU membership following the great political transformation after 1990 and the general willingness and determination on the EU side for the integration of these countries provided room for Greece's policy of making Cyprus-GA a member of the EU. By declaring that it would blockade the historical expansion of

the EU without the membership of the Cyprus-GA despite its problems, Greece succeeded in Europeanizing the issue and created the possibility for the EU to make pressure on Turkey.

- 1994-1995: Turkey-EU CU Process: The CU, seen by Turkey in the post-1990 as an important instrument not to keep up with the EU Project, partly due to the personal attitude of the then Prime Minister T. Çiller, has provided Greece with ample room for maneuver and in this way Cyprus was irreversibly included in the EU's expansion process. That is to say, Turkey, in return for the CU with the EU, gave up on blocking the Cyprus-GA's way to the EU membership.
- 1996: Kardak/Imia Crisis: This crisis brought under the light two things: The first one is the following: The EU is highly insufficient both politically and militarily and it does not have the facilities to develop a common policy or to put it into operation. The second important point is that the EU approaches the issue in the framework of "membership solidarity," which is manifested in this grave warning it gave to Turkey: The boundaries of Greece are the boundaries of the EU, any transgression is considered to be done against us."
- 1996: The S-300 Crisis in Cyprus and the Events Related to It: The EU was sided with Greece on this issue too, yet it also pressured the Cyprus-GA to give up on the S-300s. The Cyprus-GA, to avoid any problem on the way of being an EU member, had to give up on bringing S-300s to the island. This case showed the degree to which the EU could play the membership trump.
- December 1997: Luxembourg Summit and Its Aftermath: The inclusion of the Cyprus-GA in the candidacy list and the exclusion of Turkey from the expansion process and Turkey's subsequent statement that it has cut off the political dialogue with the EU on the issues including the Aegean and Cyprus problems, provided us with great opportunity of observation as to test the impact of Europeanization on conflicts and crises. It got clear that leaving Turkey out of the EU process increases its potential to get into a conflict with Greece. Turkey's rejection of the European Conference organized by the EU for Turkey in peculiar -the first of which was held in London in March 1998- took away Greece's chance to put pressure on Turkey through the EU. In this period, a much more severe

attitude against Greece emerged in the TGNA meetings. Turkey's rejection of a political dialogue till it gets from the EU a clear perspective worked out and -also partly due to the Government change in Germany- the process for Turkey's membership to the EU was resumed. "Correction of Luxembourg" was to be made in Helsinki in December 1999 and the EU was once again to be on the stage as to the relations between Greece and Turkey.

- February 1999: The scandal that the PKK Leader Ocalan's escape was ended with his being captured in the Greek Embassy in Kenya enabled Turkey to put pressure on Greece and pushed Greece to revise its policy regarding Turkey on the EU issue. There is no doubt that there were other factors behind the policy changes Greece made at that period (such as Greece's goal of monetary union, or the public support created by the earthquake); Greece realized, however, how important Europeanization is as a factor in its relations with Turkey and therefore began to support Turkey's membership to render Turkey "controllable" and to be able to put pressure on it.
- In the years 2000-2002 Greece, through Accession Partnership Document, continued its effort, by means of the EU, to go on with its policy regarding Turkey; and succeeded in carrying the bilateral problems into the EU platform.
- The new situation that had emerged with the terrorist attacks in 11 September 2001 has turned into an advantage for Turkey's relations with the EU in general; in this period Turkey put a serious effort for reform. Once again, Turkey strived to get USA's support and to balance Greece in this way.
- With the AK Parti Government, the concept of Europeanization acquired a noteworthy significance with respect to the relations between Turkey and Greece. The reason for that is the AK Parti Leadership's policy of resolving the Cyprus problem by the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003 and of opening Turkey's way leading to the EU membership thereby. The thesis that the problems are inter-connected, which had been insistently rejected in Turkey until then, has become a part of the "reality" and of the deal since 2003. Erdoğan's "win-win" discourse has laid the groundwork for Europeanization to become an

instrument for the prevention of conflicts and the resolution of problems.

- For the first time, The AK Parti Government has adopted a different approach -again within the framework of Europeanization- on the Cyprus issue, which had almost been a taboo subject. In this regard, even the risk of a conflict with the TRNC President Rauf Denктаş was taken and the Annan Plan was supported. A quest for a legitimate ground in view of the irreversible process of the Cyprus-GA's EU membership played a critical role in Turkey's aforementioned policy. It seems that the TGNA supported the Government's policy.
- Although Turkey's Cyprus policy failed with Greek's "no" in the referendum held on the island, Turkey found, in its relations with the EU, the opportunity to break free to some degree from the pressure deriving from Cyprus. This situation reflected on the 2004 Progress Report in a positive way and opened the way for negotiations. That is to say, Turkey was in a way "awarded" for the attitude it had displayed in its Cyprus policy.
- It was decided in December 2004 to start the membership negotiations with Turkey in 3 October 2005, but the nature of the relations between the Cyprus-GA and Turkey gave rise to a crisis. The Cyprus-GA wanted to gain certain political and *de facto* advantages by forcing Turkey through the EU; Turkey's efforts were oriented to resist this. The most important fact revealed here is that as far as the Cyprus issue is concerned, Europeanization has been an effective factor in the process, just like it has been with respect to the Turkey-Greece relations.
- The negotiations begun in 3 October 2005 were frozen in December 2006 under 8 headings due to the crises with the Cyprus-GA. What seems to be more influential on this decision than the Cyprus crisis is the fact that the EU states skeptical of or against Turkey's membership, especially France and Austria, has wanted to slow down the process. That the EU has turned to be a prisoner of Greece and of the Cyprus-GA and that the efforts of the Turkish side in the referendum on the Annan Plan have been ignored have been the main reactions to the EU that came up frequently in the TGNA meetings in this period. The general opinion in the TGNA was that the EU has not fulfilled its promises and has not given Turkey a fair deal on the Cyprus issue.

- One of the most important conditions for Europeanization to be effective in the relations is the EU's pursuing a clear policy about Turkey. Otherwise, the general belief in Turkey comes to be that Greece uses the EU as a "trap" for its own national interests; which, in return, decreases the effectiveness of Europeanization.
- Bold political attempts in Turkey on the issue of Greece and Cyprus could only be made in periods of stable Governments.
- Despite the unbalance between Turkey and Greece with respect to their status in the EU, it can be said that Europeanization prevents in general the relations from turning into further armed conflicts and by implication the TGNA seems to be open to such a negotiation. USA's recent loss of prestige in Iraq enables the EU and Europeanization to be a better instrument in the relations between Turkey and Greece.

## **Appendix: The Decisions Adopted in the TGNA about Cyprus**

### **I. Resolution of the TGNA: 21 January 1997<sup>139</sup>**

1. - The joint motions of the representatives of political parties in the TGNA regarding the extent of heavy armament carried out by Cyprus-GA and the fact that the threatening attitude of Cyprus-Greece towards Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey cannot be tolerated and the necessary precautions that must be taken in order to reach to a right conclusion. (4/128)

The President of the Assembly- Dear MPs, the representatives of the political parties in the TGNA submitted a motion with joint siTGNAure to our Presidencies, reading:

To the Speakership of Grand National Assembly of Turkey,

As all the parties represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, we would like our proposals, jointly prepared and presented in the appendix, to be announced to our Great Nation and world public as the decision adopted by General National Assembly of Turkey.

Respectfully yours,

The RP Vice President, The ANAP Vice President, The DYP Vice President

Oğuzhan Asiltürk Mustafa Cumhur Ersümer Saffet Arkan Bedük

The DSP Vice President The CHP Vice President The BBP Vice President

Hasan Hüsamettin Özkan Önder Sav Nevzat Yanmaz

İsmet Sezgin

The DTP Representative

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<sup>139</sup> TGNA Protocol: 22.01.1997 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 20. Dönem, 2. Yasama Yılı 49. Birleşim)

Grand National Assembly of Turkey has decided to announce that the joint declaration signed by Mr. Süleyman Demirel, the President of Republic of Turkey, and Mr. Rauf Denktaş, the President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, on 20 January 1997 was adopted and, meeting the declaration Rauf Denktaş supported and the address he made to the General National Assembly of Turkey with appreciation and respect, the articles below to Turkish and world public:

1. The heavy armament carried out by Cyprus-GA, together with the support and the encouragement of Greece, for the last three years reached to a new and serious point with the agreement about bringing Russian missiles to the island. The threatening attitude of Greece-Cyprus towards Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey cannot be tolerated.
2. The guarantee system generated by 1960 Guarantee and Alliance Treaties will hereafter continue to be in force too, modifying the treaties in question directly or indirectly and any attempt to change the balance in Cyprus and the periphery between Greece and Turkey will not be permitted.
3. Republic of Turkey will continue to maintain its effective and actual guarantee in Cyprus, will regard any attack on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an attack on Republic of Turkey.
4. The unilateral application of Cyprus GA to the EU for full membership is against the 1960 Treaties. The realization of full membership will cause division in the island and the responsibility of it will belong to the EU.
5. The embargo and the double standard exercised on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus cannot be accepted by any means.
6. Turkey will continue to supply the necessary support in order for Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to overcome its economic problems and to have a strong structure.
7. Grand National Assembly of Turkey believes that the issue will be resolved, not through armament and exertion of force, by respecting the rights of both nations in the island to construct their own administrations with their own will.

The external interventions are known by experience to make the resolution even more difficult. It must be known by all the world public, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Turkish Nation are in complete solidarity in this national cause.”

I now have presented the joint motion of the political parties represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This motion which was adopted by the common consent of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey will be fulfilled by our Presidencies. (Applauding)

## **II. Resolution of the TGNA:15 July 1999<sup>140</sup>**

"To the Speakership of Grand National Assembly of Turkey

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey has gathered, on the occasion of 25th Anniversary of Cyprus Peace Intervention, with a special agenda on 15 July 1999.

After the meeting held with the participation of Mr. Rauf Denktaş and the spokesmen of the political parties, the articles below have been determined to be announced to Turkish and world public:

The Cyprus Peace Intervention, which we attain the 25th Anniversary of, was launched against the ethnic and religious cleansing towards the existence of Turks in the island and against the attempts to unite Greece and Cyprus by eliminating State of Cyprus. After 25 years, the fact that a similar operation was carried out by NATO towards Serbs in Kosovo demonstrates how proper Cyprus Peace Intervention was.

It is upsetting to see the pleasing fact that there has been no flow of blood in Cyprus for twenty-five years disturbs some milieus. These milieus constantly organize plans and resort to provocations. Turkish side preserves its positive and peaceful attitude against these organizations and provocations.

Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, together with Turkey, displayed all sorts of efforts and goodwill for finding a just and permanent resolution that will ensure the existence and the security of both communities. In return for this, Greece-Cyprus side did not quit its policy of returning back to the state before 20 July 1974, the Enosis, Greece-Cyprus invoked the intervention of external foci instead of discussing the matter with concerned parties and complicated the reconciliation every time. Finally, application of Southern Cyprus Greek Administration to EU for full membership and the admission of the application by the other side shut down the way for resolution, paved the way for Greece's settlement in Southern Cyprus in the context of EU. Acceptance of this is impossible.

Due to the policies and the efforts of Greece to draw the external forces into matter of Cyprus, final pronouncement of Cologne Summit of G-8

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<sup>140</sup> TGNA Protocol: 15 .July 99 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 21. Dönem, 1. Yasama Yılı 34. Birleşim)

touched upon Cyprus matter, a call, practically in the form of a directive, was addressed to UN. We condemn and reject this completely.

Today, in Cyprus, there is the fact of two separate states derived from the efforts of Greeks to destroy Turkish element by violating the Zurich and London Treaties. It is impossible to find any resolution without adopting this fact in principle and equal treatment to both states,

Dangerous armament of Southern Cyprus, construction of special air and naval bases for Greece, the support given to PKK by Greece and Cyprus-GA are the threats towards the peace and the stability in the Island.

Turkey, constantly guarding its rights of guarantorship and strategic interests, will never allow the legitimate rights and interests of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, including its security and state status, to be corroded.

On this meaningful anniversary of Cyprus Peace Intervention, we appreciate and support the determination Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus perpetuates for a peaceful, just and viable resolution. The full support the Grand National Assembly of Turkey gives Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will go on continuously and unconditionally. There is no room even for the slightest doubt on this issue.

On behalf of the DSP On behalf of the MHP Fikret Uzunhasan Ömer İzgi  
On behalf of the RP On behalf of the ANAP İsmail Kahraman Zeki Çakan  
On behalf of the DYP Nevzat Ercan"

### **III. Resolution of the TGNA: 6 March 2003<sup>141</sup>**

To the Speakership of Grand National Assembly of Turkey,

As all the parties represented in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, we would like our proposals, jointly prepared and presented in the appendix, to be announced to our Great Nation and world public as the decision adopted by General National Assembly of Turkey.

Respectfully yours

Mustafa Özyürek Vice Chairman of the CHP

Salih Kapusuz Vice Chairman of the AK Parti

Mehmet Ağar President of the DYP

Grand National Assembly of Turkey has decided, meeting the address Rauf Denktaş, the President of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, made in the General National Assembly of Turkey with appreciation and respect, to announce the articles below to Turkish and world public:

1- Referring to the decisions adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on 21 January 1997 and on 15 July 1999, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey announces once again the fact that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Turkish Nation are in complete solidarity in this national cause

2- The Grand National Assembly of Turkey heartily supports the efforts Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus makes for a just and permanent solution to Cyprus matter

3- The Grand National Assembly of Turkey emphasizes the necessity that the resolution found for Cyprus matter must depend on the equality and equal statuses of the sides.

4- The Grand National Assembly of Turkey declares the requirement of preservation of guarantorship, which was derived from 1960 Treaties.

5- The Grand National Assembly of Turkey confirms that any damage in the balance constructed in Cyprus between Turkey and Greece cannot be accepted in any way.

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<sup>141</sup> TGNA Protocol: 06.March .2003 (TBMM Tutanak Dergisi: 22. Dönem, 1. Yasama, Yılı 42. Birleşim)

6- The Grand National Assembly of Turkey rejects the efforts to present the resolution of Cyprus issue as a precondition in the process of EU membership.

7 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey stresses once again that affiliation of Southern Cyprus Greek Administration to EU before Turkey is an apparent violation of international treaties.

8 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey emphasizes the importance attached to the preservation of bi-zonal structure which is the most vital factor for Turkish and Greek communities living in peace.

9 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey reminds that all the suggestions and attempts to damage bi-zonal structure will have a negative influence on the secure environment in Cyprus and lead both communities to an environment of conflict and states this must never be allowed.

10 - The Grand National Assembly of Turkey expresses its faith in that reaching to peaceful and permanent conclusion in Cyprus, provided that these general conditions are satisfied, will serve Turkey, Turkish and Greek communities of the island and peace in the region. (Applauding)

## **Abbreviations**

AK Parti	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (The Justice and Development Party)
ANAP	Anavatan Partisi (The Motherland Party)
APD	Accession Partnership Document
AP	The Additional Protocol
Bulletin EG	European Community Bulletin
Bulletin EU	European Union Bulletin
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party)
CSU	Christlich-Soziale Union Deutschlands
Cyprus-GA	Cyprus Greek Administration
DEHAP	Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People's Party)
DP	Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)
DSP	Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
DYP	Doğru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
EC	European Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FAZ	Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Daily Newspaper-Germany)
FP	Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
GAP	Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolian Project)
GNAP	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM)
TGNA	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
HEP	Halkın Emek Partisi (People's Labor Party)
HP	Halkçı Parti (People's Party)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement Party)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NP	Millet Partisi (Nation Party)
MSP	Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
NTP	Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party)
OIC	Organization of the Islamic Conference
PASOK	Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima (Political Party- Greece)
PKK	Kurdish Workers Party
RP	Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SDZ	Süddeutsche Zeitung (Daily Newspaper - Germany)
SHP	Sosyaldemokrat Halk Partisi (Social Democratic People's Party)
SODEP	Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti Social Democracy Party
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TBMM	Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
WEU	Western European Union

